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IN THE STREET TONIGHT1: AN EQUAL PROTECTION 
ANALYSIS OF BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW 
 
By: Andrew Middleman2 
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1 This Comment derives its title from a song entitled “In the Street, Today,” which 
was written and performed by The Jam.  Though released in 1977—nearly forty 
years before Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew ordinance took effect—the song’s 
depictions of crime, paranoia, and adolescent restlessness squarely describe the 
impetus for the curfew.  THE JAM, In the Street, Today, on THIS IS THE MODERN 
WORLD (Polydor Records 1977). 
2 The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor C.J. Peters, 
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, for his insightful notes to 
previous drafts of this Comment, and for his guidance and encouragement 
throughout the researching, writing, and editing processes. 
     Special thanks to Patrick Toohey, Editor-in-Chief, University of Baltimore Law 
Forum, for his thoughtful editing of later drafts, and for his flexibility throughout the 
production process.  In addition, thank you to David Schult for his feedback on 
earlier drafts, and to Deborah Richardson and Lauren M. Vint for critiquing other 
iterations of this Comment. 
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     The sun is setting on a late-August evening in Baltimore.  Children are 
playing in the gym at an elementary school in Berea, a small neighborhood in 
East Baltimore.  Ulysses Cofield is watching the clock.3  Cofield keeps the 
Fort Worth Elementary School gym open late so the neighborhood kids have 
a place to blow off steam at the end of the day.4  At 8:30 p.m., he tells a pair 
of ten-year-olds they must leave so they can be home within the next thirty 
minutes.5  Cofield closes the gym for the evening, then scans the block for 
lingering children; he wants to order the children home before police do.6  This 
anecdote hardly is unique7—the result of Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew 
ordinance,8 which took effect in August 2014.9 
     The ordinance subjects minors to both “nighttime” and “daytime” 
curfews.10  Both curfews prohibit minors from “remain[ing] in or about any 
public place or establishment”11 during specified hours, depending on the 
                                                                                                                               
3 Julia Botero, For Their Own Good? New Curfew Sends Baltimore Kids Home 





7 In Collington Square Park, another East Baltimore neighborhood, children ask: 
“What time is my curfew?”; “What if I’m out with my brother and he’s 18?”; “If I 
hide, can I still stay out and play?”  Edith Honan, Go home kids: Baltimore launches 




     In yet another Baltimore neighborhood, fifteen-year-old Isaiah Jackson and his 
friends wait until dusk to play basketball under the nocturnal glow of the streetlights, 
which illuminates a makeshift court in an alley near his home.  Emma Fitzsimmons, 
Baltimore Joins Cities Toughening Curfews, Citing Safety but Eliciting Concern, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/us/baltimore-
joins-cities-toughening-curfews-citing-safety-but-eliciting-concern.html.  But 
Jackson worries that he and his friends will attract attention from police officers who 
are looking for curfew violators.  Id. 
8 For the full text of the curfew, see BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 
19, subtit. 34, at 79-86, (Balt. City Dep’t of Legislative Reference 2015), available 
at http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/charter%20and%20Codes/code/Art 
%2019%20-%20PoliceOrds.pdf. 
9 Council B. 13-0261, Balt. City Council (Balt., Md. 2014) (providing that the 
curfew will take effect sixty days after the date on which it is enacted). 
10 See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-3, 34-4.  See also 
discussion infra Part I.C. 
11 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-3(b), 34-3(c)(1), 34-
3(c)(2), 34-4(a). 
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minor’s age, the day of the week, and the time of year.12  There are, however, 
exceptions to each curfew.13  The curfew further forbids parents “to knowingly 
permit or, by insufficient control, to allow” their children to violate the 
curfew.14  
     The curfew is among the strictest in the nation,15 and is unlike any other.  
A curfew violation does not subject a minor to civil or criminal penalties.16  
Instead, it imposes penalties on the child’s parent.17  A parent who violates the 
curfew18 faces issuance of a civil citation,19 or he or she may elect to attend 
family counseling sessions with the minor at a city-approved agency.20 
     Baltimore City’s curfew is sharply divisive; it has sparked controversy and 
debate among concerned city officials, community leaders, and citizens.21  
Chief among those concerns are the curfew’s constitutional and policy 
implications.22  The curfew raises several constitutional issues, namely a 
minor’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
                                                                                                                               
12 See id. §§ 34-3(b), 34-3(c)(1), 34-3(c)(2), 34-4(a). 
13 See id.  See also discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
14 See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-5.  See also discussion 
infra Part I.C.2. 
15 See, e.g., Lauren Gambino, Outrage follows Baltimore’s ‘deeply flawed’ youth 
curfew decision, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/-sp-baltimore-city-council-youth-
curfew; Justin Worland, Baltimore Tightens Curfew Amid Skepticism and Protests, 
TIME (Aug. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3089931/baltimore-curfew/; Yvonne Wenger 
& Colin Campbell, Baltimore's new curfew takes effect Friday, BALTIMORE SUN 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-07/news/bs-md-ci-curfew-
effective-20140806_1_curfew-collington-square-recreation-center-sandtown-
winchester; Fitzsimmons, supra note 7. 
16 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-7. 
17 See generally id. § 34-9(a). 
18 See generally id. § 34-5.  See also discussion infra Part I.C.3.b. 
19 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a)(1)(i). 
20 Id. § 34-9(a)(1)(ii). 
21 See discussion infra Part I.D.2. 
22 Luke Broadwater, Council approves tough new curfew for city youths, BALTIMORE 
SUN (May 12, 2014, 8:24 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ 
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-curfew-20140512-story.html (quoting Sonia 
Kumar, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland). 
     The ACLU sent a letter to the Baltimore City Council in opposition of the curfew, 
and considered filing a lawsuit to challenge it.  See Baltimore’s Tough Curfew Law 
Takes Effect, CBSLOCAL.COM (Aug. 8, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://washington.cbs 
local.com/2014/08/08/baltimores-tough-curfew-law-takes-effect-today/ (updated 
Aug. 9, 2014, 9:53 AM); Fitzsimmons, supra note 7; Broadwater, supra. 
23 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”)  See also discussion 
infra Parts II and III. 
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     This Comment analyzes Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew under the Equal 
Protection Clause.24  Part I provides a brief history of curfew laws in the United 
States and Maryland; discusses relevant case law in the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the Court of Appeals of Maryland; outlines the curfew’s 
restrictions and enforcement strategies; and suggests the legislative policies 
underlying the curfew extend beyond those explicitly stated in it. 
     Part II summarizes the standards of review applicable to an equal protection 
analysis; compares various constitutional challenges to juvenile curfews in the 
federal courts; and analyzes the age-based classifications in, and the racially 
disproportionate effects of, Baltimore City’s curfew. 
     Part III proposes two independent standards for reviewing Baltimore City’s 
curfew: a heightened form of rational basis review for the curfew’s age-based 
classifications, and strict scrutiny for the curfew’s racially disproportionate 
effects.  Part III also offers several alternative means by which the Baltimore 
City Council can advance the legislative policies underlying the curfew. 
     This Comment concludes that Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew will 
survive an equal protection attack to its age classifications.  This Comment 
further concludes that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply to the 
curfew’s racially disproportionate effects, but that more data is needed to 
properly review the curfew under that standard.  Finally, this Comment 
concludes that the alternative strategies offered in Part III would more 
effectively advance the legislative policies behind the curfew without 



















                                                                                                                               
24 Challenges to juvenile curfew ordinances on other grounds are beyond this 
Comment’s scope, but juvenile curfews are vulnerable to myriad constitutional 
attacks.  See cases cited infra notes 205-10. 
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I. SINKING SUNS: CURFEWS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARYLAND, AND 
BALTIMORE 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES25 
     Juvenile curfew ordinances began to develop at the turn of the twentieth 
century26 out of fear that immigrants would not control their children.27  More 
than fifty percent of all cities with 100,000 residents had enacted a juvenile 
curfew ordinance by the mid-1950s;28 more than seventy percent of such cities 
had done so by the 1990s.29 
     In the 1990s, municipalities frequently cited rising juvenile crime and 
victimization rates as the impetus for their curfews.30  Although juvenile 
                                                                                                                               
25 Part I.A. merely offers a cursory glance at the history of curfew laws in the United 
States.  Cf. Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion over Minor Rights, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2400, 2402 (2005) [hereinafter Major Confusion] (“Juvenile curfews 
have deep historical roots.”). 
     For more comprehensive discussions, see generally id. at 2402-03; Craig 
Hemmens & Katherine Bennett, Out in the Street: Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Curfews, 
and the Constitution, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 267, 277-85 (1998); Patryk J. Chudy, Note, 
Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting Standards in Adjudicating 
Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 523-525 (2000); Brian 
Privor, Article, Dusk ‘Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile 
Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 418-21 (1999). 
26 See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 280 (noting that approximately 3,000 
municipalities had enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance by the turn of the twentieth 
century); Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors’ Fundamental Rights: Juvenile 
Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1164 n.9 (1984).  See also 
Privor, supra note 25, at 418 (“American cities have implemented juvenile curfews[] 
. . . for at least 100 years.”). 
27 See Chudy, supra note 25, at 524-25; Gregory Z. Chen, Note, Youth Curfews and 
the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 134 
(1997); Brian J. Lester, Comment, Is It Too Late for Juvenile Curfews: QUTB Logic 
and the Constitution, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 668 (1996) (citation omitted). 
28 See Major Confusion, supra note 25, at 2403 (citation omitted); Chudy, supra note 
25, at 525. 
29 See Major Confusion, supra note 25, at 2403 (stating that seventy-three percent of 
cities with 100,000 residents had enacted a juvenile curfew by 1995) (citation 
omitted); Privor, supra note 25, at 419 (stating that approximately eighty percent of 
cities with 100,000 residents have passed curfews between 1949 and 1999) (citation 
omitted).  See also Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility 
Laws: Sending Messages, but What Kind and To Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 19 
n.69 (stating that more than seventy-five percent of the 200 largest U.S. cities had a 
juvenile curfew ordinance in effect by 1995) (citations omitted). 
30 Chudy, supra note 25, at 519 & n.2, 525.  See also Major Confusion, supra note 
25, at 2403 (“In the 1990s, . . . juvenile victimization and crime rates seemed to 
explode across the country.”); Privor, supra note 25, at 420-21 (stating that juvenile 
arrests for violent crimes increased by seventy percent between 1989 and 1993); 
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curfews are most prevalent in urban areas,31 municipalities have enacted 
curfews “in a variety of contexts and circumstances,”32 including attempts to 
control loitering and vagrancy,33 subdue civil disorder and race riots,34 regulate 
access to public parks,35 and “keep African Americans off the streets during 
certain hours of the night.”36  The Supreme Court has even upheld a general 
curfew and other restrictions as a constitutional means to protect national 
security.37 
     In Hirabayashi v. United States,38 for example, the Court upheld a curfew 
which confined Japanese-Americans who resided in designated military areas 
to their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.39 as a valid “defense measure[] for 
the avowed purpose of safeguarding the military area . . . at a time of threatened 
                                                                                                                               
Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 268 (“There is widespread sentiment in 
America that juvenile crime is out of control.”). 
31 Privor, supra note 25, at 416. 
32 Chudy, supra note 25, at 523. 
33 See generally, e.g., Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1916) (upholding a 
Juneau, Alaska, ordinance which defined and prohibited vagrants from “wandering 
about the streets of the city” after 11 p.m.); Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. 
Ga. 1977) (enjoining the city of Eatonton, Georgia, from enforcing two ordinances 
which prohibited loitering in public places).  See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 523-
24. 
34 See generally, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(upholding against First Amendment, vagueness, and overbreadth challenges a 
temporary nighttime curfew in force during a declared state of emergency in 
Asheville, North Carolina, that resulted from a “clash” between police and African-
American high school students); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 
1969) (upholding against First Amendment, due process, and vagueness challenges a 
nighttime curfew in force in Washington, D.C., in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s assassination); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 199 n.3, 201, 163 N.W. 2d 
207, 210 n.3, 211 (1968) (stating that an emergency curfew in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, was “an emergency measure undertaken to restore order in the 
community.”).  See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 524.  
     The Glover court stated that “the nation has witnessed in recent years numerous 
civil disorders and disturbances in American cities which have increasingly had to 
resort to curfews to deal with such disorders.”  Glover, 250 A.2d at 560 (citations 
omitted).  Cf. discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
35 See generally, e.g., Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Wis. 1971) 
(involving a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, ordinance which prohibited one’s presence in a 
certain public park between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.).  See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 
524. 
36 See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 523 (citing Peter L. Scherr, The Juvenile Curfew 
Ordinance: In Search of a New Standard of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 163, 164-65 (1992)). 
37 See cases cited infra notes 38-45.  See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 524. 
38 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (opinion of Stone, J.). 
39 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83-84. 
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air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces.”40  In Korematsu v. United 
States,41 the Court upheld Congress’s authorization42 to remove more than 
112,000 Japanese-Americans from designated military areas43 as an 
“aggregation of hardships”44 incident to war.45 
     The Supreme Court decided both Hirabayashi and Korematsu under the 
Equal Protection Clause.46  Curfews are, however, subject to constitutional 
attack under a host of other grounds,47 including the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments, and the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.48  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never decided 
the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance.49  Moreover, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has reviewed juvenile curfews only within the due 






                                                                                                                               
40 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95, 102.  Accord Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 
115, 116-17 (1943) (opinion of Strone, J.) (following Hirabayashi in affirming a 
Japanese-American’s conviction for violating a wartime curfew). 
41 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (opinion of Black, J.). 
42 Id. at 216. 
43 Id. at 236, 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 219. 
45 Id. 
46 Korematsu and Hirabayashi are the only two Supreme Court rulings to affirm the 
constitutionality of a race-based classification.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 715 (4th ed. 2011).  But cf. 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (characterizing the internment 
of more than 112,000 Japanese-Americans as “one of the most sweeping and 
complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation.”).  
     These decisions, however, have since been looked upon with disfavor.  See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra.  See also Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 279, 932 A.2d 
571, 607 (2007) (opinion of Harrell, J.) (“[T]he Supreme Court has characterized 
repeatedly as suspect classes distinctions based on . . . national origin[.]”); Chew v. 
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 712, 527 A.2d 332, 347-48 (1987) (“The Supreme Court has 
deemed discrimination by states on the basis of ancestry to be violative of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted). 
47 See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, construction, and effect of 
juvenile curfew regulations, 83 A.L.R. 4th 1056 (1991). 
48 See generally id. 
49 See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 273 n.40 (1998); Susan M. Horowitz, 
A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial Review of Juvenile Curfew 
Ordinances, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 381, 383 (1991). 
50 See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
51 Privor, supra note 25, at 428. 
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B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS IN MARYLAND 
1. Curfews in Other Maryland Counties and Municipalities52 
     Baltimore City is not the only county53 or municipality54 in Maryland that 
can enforce a curfew.55  At least two other counties—Cecil County and Prince 
George’s County—have a juvenile curfew ordinance currently in force.56  The 
Howard County and Prince George’s County executives each are statutorily 
authorized to establish an emergency curfew.57 
                                                                                                                               
52 The discussion of curfew laws in other Maryland counties and municipalities in 
Part I.B.1. is not exhaustive.  All local curfew laws referenced in this discussion are 
accessible in one of two online databases, eCode360 or Municode.  See ECODE360, 
http://www.generalcode.com/codification/ecode/library (last visited Oct. 12, 2015); 
MUNICODE, https://www.municode.com/library/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
53 See MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 1-101(e) (“ ‘County’ means a county of 
[Maryland] or Baltimore City.”). 
54 The term “municipality,” as used in Part I.B. refers to a city or town located in one 
of Maryland’s twenty-four counties; it does not refer to a county or Baltimore City.  
See supra note 53.  Such references do not necessarily include the statutory 
definition of “municipality.”  Cf. MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 1-101(g)            
(“ ‘Municipality’ means a municipality that is organized under Article XI-E of the 
Maryland Constitution.”). 
55 See infra notes 56-57, 61-65.  See also Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 273 
(“The vast majority of juvenile curfews are local municipal legislation.”). 
56 CECIL CNTY., MD., CODE pt. II, ch. 180 (General Code Online through Nov. 4, 
2014), available at http://www.ecode360.com/15792287; PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., 




     Neither Cecil County nor Prince George’s County has explicit power to enact a 
juvenile curfew.  Instead, such authority might be inherent or implied in other 
powers granted under those counties’ charters.  See, e.g., CECIL CNTY., MD., 
CHARTER § 301 (General Code Outline through Nov. 4, 2014) (“[T]he Council may 
enact public local laws for the peace, good government, health, safety or welfare of 
the County.”), available at http://www.ecode360.com/15790738.  Cf. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
57 See HOWARD CNTY., MD., CODE §§ 6.103, 6.104 (Municode Library though July 
16, 2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/MD/howard_county/ 
codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=HOCOCO_TIT6COEXEXBR_SUBTITLE_1TH
COEX; PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., CODE §§ 6-102, 6-135 (Municode Library 
through Aug. 26, 2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/MD/ 
prince_george's_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIITI17PULOLAPRG
ECOMA_SUBTITLE_6EMMA_DIV1GEPR. 
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     Similarly, at least forty-five municipalities in Maryland either are explicitly 
authorized to enact a juvenile curfew,58 have one currently in force,59 or have 
the power to establish and enforce an emergency curfew.60  Twenty-three 
municipalities do not have a juvenile curfew currently in force, but are 
authorized under their charters to enact one.61  In contrast, twenty 
municipalities62 have a juvenile curfew currently in force,63 nine of which are 
not explicitly authorized by that municipality’s charter.64  Twelve 
                                                                                                                               
     For a discussion of an emergency curfew in Baltimore City that was enforced 
between April 28 and May 4, 2015, see discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
58 See infra note 61. 
59 See infra notes 62-64. 
60 See infra note 65. 
61 Berlin, Brentwood, Cambridge, Chesapeake Beach, Delmar, Denton, Fruitland, 
Glenarden, Hagerstown, Hampstead, Indian Head, La Plata, Leonardtown, 
Lonaconing, Mardela Springs, Ocean City, Pittsville, Princess Anne, Rockville, St. 
Michaels, Sharptown, Snow Hill, and Willards.  See, e.g., BERLIN, MD., CHARTER § 
C5-1(B)(14) (Municode through Nov. 18, 2014), available at 
https://www.municode.com/library/md/berlin/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PT
ITHCH_ARTVGEPO_SC5-1ENPO; BRENTWOOD, MD., CHARTER § 402.11 
(General Code Outline through June 6, 2013), available at http://www.ecode360. 
com/27505182; CAMBRIDGE, MD., CHARTER § 3-27(16) (Municode through Feb. 27, 
2012), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/cambridge/codes/ 
code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTITHCH_S3-27POLI; CHESAPEAKE BEACH, MD., 
CHARTER § C-501(16) (General Code Outline through Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.ecode360.com/15138318; WICOMICO CNTY., MD., DELMAR CHARTER § 
DC4-12(C)(14) (General Code Outline), available at 
http://www.ecode360.com/13348784. 
62 Aberdeen, Emmitsburg, Federalsburg, Forest Heights, Frederick, Galena, Havre de 
Grace, Laurel, Manchester, Middletown, Mt. Airy, Myersville, New Windsor, North 
Beach, Ridgely, Rock Hall, Smithsburg, Sykesville, Westminster, and Woodsboro.  
See infra notes 63-64. 
63 See, e.g., FOREST HEIGHTS, MD., CODE § 13.7 (General Code Outline through Jan. 
21, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/26873408; GALENA, MD., CODE 
ch. 112 (General Code Outline through July 7, 2014), available at http://www.ecode 
360.com/16069635; HAVRE DE GRACE, MD., CODE ch. 52 (General Code Outline 
through June 1, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/8367988; LAUREL, 
MD., CODE ch. 9, art. V (Municode through Dec. 15, 2015), available at 
https://www.municode.com/library/md/laurel/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=C
H9MIPROF_ARTVCUPARE; MT. AIRY, MD., CODE ch. 51 (General Code Outline 
through June 1, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/6264839. 
64 See, e.g., ABERDEEN, MD., CODE ch. 272 (General Code Outline through May 18, 
2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/14364539; EMMITSBURG, MD., MUN. 
CODE § 9.12.040 (Municode through July 17, 2015), available at https://www. 
municode.com/library/md/emmitsburg/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT9PUP
EMOWE_CH9.12OFAGMI_9.12.040JUCU; FEDERALSBURG, MD., CODE ch. 48 
(General Code Outline through Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ecode 
360.com/9899580; FREDERICK, MD., CODE ch. 15 (Municode through June 30, 
2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/frederick/codes/ 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 46.1	  
	  
20 
municipalities have the power to establish and enforce an emergency curfew.65 
     In total, at least three of Maryland’s twenty-four counties, including 
Baltimore City,66 have a county-wide juvenile curfew currently in force.67  
Among forty-three municipalities which are explicitly or implicitly authorized 
to enact a juvenile curfew,68 twenty-three do not have one currently in force.69  
These patterns suggest that juvenile curfews are relatively uncommon in 
Maryland.70 
     Constitutional challenges to juvenile curfews in Maryland are even more 
infrequent.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland has never decided a 
constitutional challenge to a county-wide curfew; it has decided a 
constitutional challenge to a municipal curfew only twice.71 
 
2. Maryland’s Highest Court Upholds One Local Curfew and 
Invalidates Another 
     Only two cases which lodged a constitutional attack against a juvenile 
curfew ordinance have reached the Court of Appeals of Maryland: 
Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City72 and Ashton v. Brown.73  The 
                                                                                                                               
code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIITHCO_CH15OFIS; MANCHESTER, MD., CODE ch. 
77 (General Code Outline through Jan. 13, 2015), available at 
http://www.ecode360.com/11818001. 
65 Annapolis, Berlin, Forest Heights, Hagerstown, La Plata, Laurel, Ocean City, 
Ridgely, Salisbury, Smithsburg, Snow Hill, and Westminster.  See, e.g., ANNAPOLIS, 
MD., CODE § 11.48.040(B)(3) (Municode through Aug. 3, 2015), available at 
https://www.municode.com/library/md/annapolis/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId
=TIT11PUPEMOWE_CH11.48EMMA_11.48.040DESTEMFF; BERLIN, MD., CODE 
§ 10-21 (Municode through Nov. 18, 2014), available at https://www.municode. 
com/library/md/berlin/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=SPAADLE_CH10CIEM_
ARTIIEMMA_S10-21CU; FOREST HEIGHTS, MD., CODE § 2.9(A)(1) (General Code 
Outline through Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/29005190; 
HAGERSTOWN, MD., CODE § 76-3 (General Code Outline through Sept. 30, 2014), 
available at http://www.ecode360.com/9906165; LA PLATA, MD., CODE § 146-3 
(Jan. 31, 2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/la_plata/ 
codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH146PEGOOR_146-3CU. 
66 See supra note 53. 
67 See supra note 56. 
68 See supra notes 61-64. 
69 See supra note 61. 
70 See CUMBERLAND, MD., CODE § 11-131 (1966 & Supp. 1977), repealed by 
Cumberland, Md., Ordinance 3205 (Oct. 17, 1995) (Municode through Aug. 28, 
2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/cumberland/codes/ 
code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICUCO_CH11MIPROF_ARTVOFINPUMO_S11-
131RE. 
71 See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
72 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964) (opinion of Hammond, J.). 
73 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) (opinion of Eldridge, J.). 
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curfew at issue in Thistlewood “prohibited persons under twenty-one [years 
old] from remaining on the streets of [Ocean City] between 12:01 a.m. and 
6:00 a.m.” during Labor Day Weekend in 1963.74  A trial magistrate convicted 
two defendants who violated the curfew.75 
     The defendants sought an annulment of their convictions on grounds that 
the curfew unconstitutionally restricted their “personal liberties.”76  Four 
judges upheld the curfew.77  The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, arguing that the curfew violated their substantive due process 
rights.78 
     The court of appeals interpreted the curfew’s meaning before it turned to 
the due process question.  The court concluded that Ocean City’s curfew was 
promulgated “against those who . . . loiter or congregate” in public areas “as a 
short term emergency measure to protect both its citizens and visitors from 
groups of minors and the minors from themselves.”79  The court held, 
therefore, that the curfew prohibited minors from “remaining” on city streets 
and in other public areas, but that it permitted their mere presence there.80 
     Turning to the due process question, the court concluded that there was “a 
real and substantial relation”81 between the curfew and “the objects sought to 
be attained.”82  The court held, therefore, that the curfew did not infringe upon 
the petitioners’ fundamental rights.83  Accordingly, the court upheld the 
curfew’s constitutional validity,84 and affirmed the petitioners’ convictions.85 
     Like Thistlewood, the curfew at issue in Ashton implicated the Due Process 
Clause,86 but the court of appeals struck down it down as unconstitutionally 
vague.87  At issue in Ashton was the City of Frederick’s curfew,88 which 
prohibited a minor less than eighteen years old from “remain[ing] in or upon 
any public place or any establishment”89 from 11 p.m. until 6 a.m. during the 
week, and from 11:59 p.m. until 6 a.m. on the weekend.90 
                                                                                                                               
74 Thistlewood, 236 Md. at 549, 204 A.2d at 689. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 550, 204 A.2d at 689. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 556, 204 A.2d at 693. 
80 Thistlewood, 236 Md. at 555, 204 A.2d at 692. 
81 Id. at 556, 204 A.2d at 693. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 557, 204 A.2d at 693. 
84 Id. at 557, 204 A.2d at 694. 
85 Id. 
86 See generally Ashton, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447. 
87 Id. at 93, 660 A.2d at 458. 
88 Id. at 79, 660 A.2d at 451. 
89 Id. at 80 & n.1, 660 A.2d at 452 & n.1 (citing FREDERICK, MD., CODE § 15-10 
(1966 & Supp. 1992)). 
90 Id. at 80 & n.1, 660 A.2d at 452 & n.1 (citing FREDERICK, MD., CODE §§ 15-9(a), 
15-10 (1966 & Supp. 1992)). 
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     Police detained the plaintiffs and twenty-six other suspected curfew 
violators outside a privately-owned business, of which the clientele was 
predominately African-American.91  At least twenty-five of the twenty-eight 
people detained were African-American.92 
     The plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of Frederick’s curfew was racially 
motivated.93  They sought a declaratory judgment that the curfew was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and infringed upon their First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, among others.94  The plaintiffs further sought 
an injunction against the curfew’s enforcement.95 
     The Circuit Court for Frederick County concluded that the curfew was 
constitutional, and therefore, enforceable.96  The court, however, did not rule 
on the plaintiffs’ allegations that the curfew’s enforcement was racially 
discriminatory.97 
     The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,98 
which concluded that Frederick’s curfew was unconstitutional99 because it 
“burden[ed] the fundamental rights of minors and [was] not justified by any 
compelling governmental interest.”100  Reasoning in the alternative, the court 
of special appeals also held that the curfew was unconstitutionally vague.101  
Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s judgment.102  Like the trial court, 
though, the court of special appeals did not rule on the appellants’ contention 
that enforcement of the curfew was racially discriminatory.103 
     The City of Frederick appealed to the court of appeals,104 which decided 
the issue on vagueness grounds.105  The court concluded that neither the public 
nor police could determine from the curfew’s prohibitions and exceptions 
whether a minor’s “nighttime excursion” was violative of, or protected by, the 
                                                                                                                               
91 Id. at 82, 660 A.2d at 453. 
92 Ashton, 339 Md. at 82 & n.4, 660 A.2d at 453 & n.4 (“According to affidavits 
filed by the plaintiffs, twenty-eight suspected curfew violators were detained in the 
crackdown . . ., all of whom were African-American. * * * According to the 
defendants, twenty-five of the twenty-eight arrestees were African-American.”). 
93 Id. at 82, 660 A.2d at 453-54. 
94 Id. at 84, 660 A.2d at 454. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 85, 660 A.2d at 454. 
97 Id. 
98 Ashton, 339 Md. at 85, 660 A.2d at 454. 
99 Id. at 85, 660 A.2d at 455. 
100 Id. (quoting Brown v. Ashton, 93 Md. App. 25, 46, 611 A.2d 599, 609 (1992)). 
101 Id. at 85-86, 660 A.2d at 455 (citing Brown, 93 Md. App. at 49, 611 A.2d at 611). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 86, 660 A.2d at 455. 
104 Ashton, 339 Md. at 86, 660 A.2d at 455.  Both parties petitioned the court of 
appeals for a writ of certiorari.  Id.  Only the City of Frederick’s appeal, which 
challenged the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment that the curfew was 
unconstitutional, id., is relevant to this discussion. 
105 Id. at 88 n.8, 660 A.2d at 456 n.8. 
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curfew.106  The court held, therefore, that the curfew was unconstitutionally 
vague, and thus violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.107  The 
court of appeals, like the courts below, did not address whether the curfew’s 
enforcement was racially discriminatory.108 
     Ashton suggests that Maryland courts are hesitant to review a juvenile 
curfew ordinance on grounds of race discrimination, perhaps because courts 
in different jurisdictions do not analyze the issue under a uniform standard.109  
However, Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew110 is vulnerable to such an 
attack,111 and an attack on grounds of age discrimination.112  In contrast, a 
challenge to the city’s power to enforce an emergency curfew has proved 
futile.113 
 
3. An Emergency Curfew in Baltimore City Is Challenged 
     Freddie Gray’s death on April 19, 2015,114 ignited a wave of protests, and, 
according to various media characterizations, “riots,” “civil unrest,” “civil 
disorder”, and “the Baltimore uprising.”115  On April 27, the Governor of 
Maryland, Larry Hogan, declared a state of emergency116 in response to the 
public outcry following Gray’s death.117  A few hours later, the Mayor of 
                                                                                                                               
106 Id. at 89, 660 A.2d at 456-57. 
107 Id. at 93, 660 A.2d at 456.  Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is 
Maryland’s analog to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Compare MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 24 (“That no man ought to be 
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, 
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, 
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law[.]”). 
108 Ashton, 339 Md. at 88 n.8, 660 A.2d at 456 n.8. 
109 See Chudy, supra note 25, at 522. 
110 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
111 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
112 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
113 See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
114 On April 12, 2015, police officers arrested Freddie Gray, who suffered fatal 
injuries while he was in police custody.  Gray fell into a coma, and died a week later, 
on April 19.  For detailed accounts of Freddie Gray’s death, its aftermath, and the 
criminal prosecution of the six police officers who allegedly were involved, see 
Freddie Gray & Baltimore Unrest, BALTIMORESUN.COM, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/ (last visited Oct. 2, 
2015). 
115 Id. 
116 See Exec. Order No. 01.01.2015.16, 42 Md. Reg. 644 (May 1, 2015). 
117 The executive order cited Baltimore City’s need to: 
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Baltimore City, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, announced that an emergency 
curfew would take effect the following day, and would remain in force until 
May 4.118   
     The emergency curfew applied equally to juveniles and adults between 10 
p.m. and 5 a.m. on the following day.119  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
upheld a challenge to Rawlings-Blake’s power to impose and enforce the 
emergency curfew.120   
     The challenge arose when a man was charged with violating the emergency 
curfew.121  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that Rawlings-
Blake’s imposition and enforcement of the emergency curfew was within her 
mayoral powers as a “conservator of the peace.”122 
    Similarly, Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew is within the City Council’s 
legislative powers, as granted by the city’s charter123 and the Maryland General 
Assembly.124  Whether the City Council’s exercise of that power comports 
with the Equal Protection Clause is explored in Parts II and III. 
                                                                                                                               
take protective actions to protect the lives and property of citizens 
being currently impacted . . .; 
 
* * * 
 
to activate certain emergency contracts, and to facilitate the 
deployment of requisite resources . . .; 
 
* * * 
 
Use . . . resources of the Maryland National Guard[.] 
 
Id. at 644. 
118 Balt., Md., Curfew – Emergency (Apr. 27, 2015), available at 
http://www.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/Curfew-Emergency-20150427.pdf. 
119 Id. at 1-2. 
120 See Justin Fenton, Judge upholds mayor’s curfew authority while dismissing 
charge, BALTIMORE SUN (July 7, 2015 10:03 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-curfew-upheld-
20150707-story.html.  The circuit court did not issue a written order.  Instead, it 
announced its ruling on the record in open court. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  See also BALT. CITY, MD., CHARTER art IV, § 4(a), at 110, (Balt. City Dep’t 
of Legislative Reference 2015) (“The Mayor, by virtue of the office, shall have all 
the powers of a conservator of the peace.”), available at http://archive.baltimore 
city.gov/Portals/0/Charter%20and%20Codes/ChrtrPLL/01%20-%20Charter.pdf. 
123 See BALT., MD., CHARTER art. II, § 47; art. III, § 11 (Balt. City Dep’t of 
Legislative Reference 2015), available at http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/ 
Portals/0/Charter%20and%20Codes/ChrtrPLL/01%20-%20Charter.pdf. 
124 See MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 10-206(a)(2) (“A county council may pass 
any ordinance, resolution, or bylaw not inconsistent with State law that: . . . may aid 
in maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the county.”). 




C. BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW125 
1. Defining the Curfew and Its General Prohibitions126 
     Baltimore City’s new curfew applies to minors127 in public places,128 and 
their parents.129  Both the daytime and nighttime curfews prohibit a minor from 
“remain[ing]130 in or about any public place or establishment”131 during 
specified hours, depending on the minor’s age, the day of the week, and the 
time of the year.132  The curfew further prohibits a minor’s parent from 
knowingly permitting, or by insufficient control allowing, the minor to violate 
either curfew.133 
 
2. The Curfew’s Time and Place Restrictions 
a. The Daytime Curfew134 
     The daytime curfew requires minors less than sixteen years old to be in 
school between 7:30 a.m. and 3 p.m. on any school day.135  The daytime 




                                                                                                                               
125 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, subtit. 34. 
126 For the curfew’s relevant definitions, see id. § 34-1.  See also infra notes 127-31. 
127 “Minor” means any person less than seventeen years old.  BALT., MD., CODE - 
UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-1(d).  This Comment hereinafter uses the terms 
“minor,” “juvenile,” and “child” or “children” interchangeably. 
128 “Public place” means any public street, highway, road, alley, park, playground, 
wharf, dock, public building, or vacant lot.  Id. § 34-1(g) (quotation marks omitted). 
129 “Parent” means a minor’s biological parent, legal guardian, or any person at least 
eighteen years old who is legally responsible for the care and custody of a minor.  Id. 
§ 34-1(f). 
130 “Remain” means to loiter, idle, wander, stroll, or play in or upon.  Id. § 34-1(h) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
131 “Establishment” means any privately-owned, for-profit place of business, or any 
public place of amusement or entertainment.  Id. § 34-1(b). 
132 See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
133 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-5.  The curfew also 
prohibits the “operator” of an establishment, and his agents and employees, from 
knowingly permitting a minor in violation of the daytime or nighttime curfews to 
remain on the premises.  Id. §§ 34-1(e)(1), 34-6.  However, the curfew’s 
constitutional implications upon establishments and their owners, if any, are beyond 
this Comment’s scope. 
134 See generally id. § 34-4. 
135 Id. § 34-4(a). 
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•   the minor has written proof from school authorities  
excusing attendance at a particular time;136 
•   the minor is accompanied by a parent or person at least  
twenty-one years of age;137 or 
•   the minor is traveling to or from school.138 
     The nighttime curfew, however, is more nuanced than its daytime 
counterpart.139 
 
b. The Nighttime Curfew140 
     The nighttime curfew differs for minors who are less than fourteen years 
old and those who are between fourteen and seventeen years old.141  The 
nighttime curfew categorically requires minors less than fourteen years old to 
be at home between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. of the following day—regardless of the 
day of the week or time of the year.142 
     In contrast, the curfew permits minors between fourteen and seventeen 
years old to stay out until 10 p.m. on weeknights, and until 11 p.m. on the 
weekends, during the academic year.143  During the summer months, minors 
between fourteen and seventeen years old may be out until 11 p.m. every night 
of the week.144 
     For minors between fourteen and seventeen years old, the curfew’s two 
different time components145 seem to be at odds with each other.  The curfew’s 
plain language does not clearly indicate whether minors between fourteen and 
seventeen years old are permitted to stay out until 11 p.m. on a weeknight 
during the academic year when school is closed the following day.146 
                                                                                                                               
136 Id. § 34-4(b)(1). 
137 Id. § 34-4(b)(2). 
138 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-4(b)(3) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
139 See discussion infra Part I.C.2.b. 
140 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3. 
141 Compare id. § 34-3(b), with id. § 34-3(c)(1) to (c)(2).  However, the nighttime 
curfew terminates at 6 a.m. each day, regardless of the minor’s age.  See id. §§ 34-
3(b), 34-3(c)(1) to (c)(2)(iii). 
142 See id. § 34-3(b). 
143 See id. § 34-3(c)(2)(i) to (c)(2)(iii). 
144 See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3(c)(1). 
145 See id. § 34-3(c)(1) to (c)(2)(iii). 
146 Compare id. § 34-3(c)(1) (“From and including 12:01 a.m. on the Friday 
preceding Memorial Day each year through 12 midnight of the last Sunday of August 
each year, no minor at least 14, but less than 17, years of age may remain in or about 
any public place or any establishment between the hours of 11 p.m. on any day and 6 
a.m. of the following day.”) (emphasis added), with id. § 34-3(c)(2)(iii) (“For the 
remainder of the calendar year, no minor at least 14, but less than 17, years of age 
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     Nonetheless, the nighttime curfew provides for seven exceptions.147  It 
protects minors who are: 
•   accompanied by a parent;148 
•   exercising their First Amendment rights under the U.S.  
Constitution;149 
•   traveling in a motor vehicle;150 
•   traveling to, engaged in, or returning from their place of  
employment;151 
•   involved in an emergency;152 
•   present on the sidewalk abutting their residence;153 or 
•   traveling to, attending, or returning from an official  
school, religious, or recreational activity.154 













                                                                                                                               
may remain in or about any public place or any establishment . . . between the hours 
of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. of the following day, on any other day of the week.”) 
(emphasis added). 
147 See infra notes 148-54. 
148 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3(a)(1). 
149 Id. § 34-3(a)(2).  This provision does not delineate the permissible scope within 
which a minor may exercise his or her First Amendment rights.  For example, this 
provision seems to permit a minor’s participation in a protest during the late evening 
and early morning hours, subject to other constitutionally valid time, place, and 
manner restrictions, even though the curfew generally prohibits the minor’s presence 
in public during those times. 
150 Id. § 34-3(a)(3). 
151 Id. § 34-3(a)(4). 
152 Id. § 34-3(a)(5) (quotation marks omitted). 
153 Id. § 34-3(a)(6). 
154 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3(a)(7). 
155 See generally id. § 34-3(a). 
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3. Enforcing the Curfew156 
a. Enforcing the Curfew Against Minors157 
     Police do not specifically target curfew violators.158  Instead, detentions for 
curfew violations occur during routine patrol.159 
     Police may detain a minor believed to be in violation of the curfew,160 but 
the detention is not an arrest, nor does it create a criminal record for the 
minor.161  Police must take a minor believed to be in violation of the curfew to 
the minor’s school,162 a “Youth Connection Center,”163 or the minor’s home.164 
     The Youth Connection Center165 must notify a parent of the violation and 
take appropriate measures to reduce the probability that the minor will commit 
                                                                                                                               
156 See generally id. §§ 34-8, 34-8.1, 34-9. 
157 See generally id. § 34-8. 
158 Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese, Dir., Mayor’s Office on Criminal 
Justice, City of Balt., and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s 
Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt. (Feb. 25, 2015). 
159 Id. 
160 A police officer who has reason to believe that a minor is violating either the 
daytime or nighttime curfew must “seek to obtain” the minor’s name, age, address, 
school or other valid identification, and the name of his parent(s).  BALT., MD., CODE 
- UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-8(a)(1) to (a)(2). 
161 Id. § 34-7.  This provision does not preclude a police officer from arresting a 
minor who is engaged in criminal activity while in violation of the curfew.  
Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 
158.  In such cases, police will not enforce the curfew against the minor, but they 
will charge the minor with a crime.  Id. 
162 This provision applies only to the daytime curfew.  See BALT., MD., CODE - 
UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-8(b)(1)(i). 
163 Id. §§ 34-8(b)(1)(ii), 34-8(c)(1)(ii). 
     The curfew does not explicitly define “Youth Connection Center.”  See generally 
id. § 34-1.  Nevertheless, police may transport a minor believed to be in violation of 
the daytime curfew to a “truancy center.”  See id. § 34-1(i).  Similarly, police may 
transport a minor believed to be in violation of the nighttime curfew to a “juvenile 
holding facility.”  See id. § 34-1(c). 
     Both terms mean a place to which minors believed to be in violation of the curfew 
may be taken to determine an appropriate course of action.  Id. §§ 34-1(c), 34-1(i). 
164 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-8(b)(1)(iii), 34-
8(c)(1)(i). 
165 Baltimore City operates two Youth Connection Centers.  Press Release, Office of 
the Mayor of Balt. City, Mayor Rawlings-Blake Releases Curfew Violation Numbers 
(Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with Office of the Mayor of Balt. City), available at 
http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2014-09-11-curfew-violation-
numbers-released. 
     The Lillian Jones Recreation Center (1301 North Stricker Street) is located in the 
Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood in West Baltimore; Collington Square 
Community Recreation Center (1409 North Patterson Park Avenue) is located in the 
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a subsequent violation.166  If the minor’s parent or another adult family 
member167 does not claim the minor from a youth connection center by 6 a.m. 
the following morning, the minor may be referred to or placed in the custody 
of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services.168 
 
b. Enforcing the Curfew Against Parents169 
     Police may issue a civil citation to a parent who violates the curfew for the 
first time.170  In lieu of being issued a civil citation for the first offense, a parent 
may agree to attend family counseling sessions with the minor at a city-
approved agency.171  A parent who subsequently violates the curfew is guilty 
of a misdemeanor172 and is subject to a maximum fine of $500 and/or 
community service.173  Thus, the curfew’s enforcement strategy and sanctions 
on parents imply legislative policies beyond those stated in the ordinance.174 
 
D. THE BALTIMORE CITY COUNCIL’S INTERESTS UNDERLYING ITS 
CURFEW 
 
1.   Explicit Policies: Reducing Juvenile Crime and Delinquency, and 
Promoting Education 
 
a.   The Baltimore City Council’s Legislative Findings 
 
     Section 34-2 of Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew ordinance states three 
legislative findings underlying the curfew.175  First, the “substantial increase” 
in the volume and severity of crimes committed by minors is a “menace to the 
                                                                                                                               
Broadway East neighborhood in East Baltimore.  Id. 
166 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-8(b)(2)(i) to (b)(2)(ii), 
34-8(c)(2). 
167 See id. § 34-8(c)(2)(i) (“If the minor is taken to a Youth Connection Center, the 
facility shall notify a parent or an adult brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent to 
come and take charge of the minor.”). 
168 Id. § 34-8(c)(3)(ii). 
169 See generally id. § 34-9(a). 
170 Id. § 34-9(a)(1)(i). 
171 Id. § 34-9(a)(1)(ii).  A parent’s attendance at a family counseling session is 
entirely voluntary.  Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana 
Bhattacharya, supra note 158.  As such, there are no records of parents who opt for 
the family counseling sessions.  Id.  Family Tree is one example of an organization 
which provides family counseling services.  Id.  For additional information for 
Family Tree, see FAMILYTREE, http://www.familytreemd.org/. 
172 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a)(2). 
173 Id. § 34-9(a)(2)(i) to (a)(2)(ii). 
174 See discussion infra Part I.D.2. 
175 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-2. 
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preservation of public peace, safety, health, morals, and welfare.”176  The 
Mayor of Baltimore and the Baltimore City Council dubbed this finding an 
“emergency.”177 
                                                                                                                               
176 Id. § 34-2(1). 
     Indeed, reducing the juvenile crime rate and protecting juveniles from becoming 
victims of crime are among the most common policies underlying juvenile curfew 
ordinances.  See Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: 
Constitutional Standards & the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 653, 659 (2000).  See also Privor, supra note 25, at 416 (“Many 
municipal policymakers have embraced juvenile curfew laws to keep youths off the 
streets and out of harm's way during the nighttime and early morning hours.”).  But 
see Memorandum from Shalik D. Fulton, Comm’r Chairman, Balt. City Youth 
Comm’n, and Cody L. Dorsey, Comm. Chairman, Balt. City Youth Comm’n, to 
Bernard C. “Jack” Young, President, Balt. City Council (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with 
author) (“We have spoken to our peers, and some believe this legislation will not 
deter youth from committing crime.”). 
177 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-2(1). 
     The volume and severity of crime in Baltimore City is not exclusive to minors.  
See, e.g., Justin Fenton & Luke Broadwater, Stray bullets again strike bystanders in 
city, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 5, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/ 
news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-bystander-shootings-20151005-story.html 
(reporting an eighty percent rise in gun violence in Baltimore City between 2014 and 
2015, and that the number of homicides in the city is on pace to reach 300 for the 
first time since the 1990s); Justin Fenton, Christina Jedra, & Mayah Collins, 45 
murders in 31 days: Looking back at Baltimore's deadliest month, BALTIMORE SUN 
(Aug. 29, 2015, 12:08 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-ci-july-
homicide-victims-20150829-story.html (reporting the highest monthly homicide 
total in Baltimore City, forty-five, since August 1972, when the city had 
approximately 275,000 more residents). 
     Still, the Mayor and City Council’s findings as to the volume and severity of 
juvenile crime and victimization are not unfounded.  See, e.g., Mark Puente, Girl, 9, 
shot Sunday afternoon in Waverly, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 4, 2015, 9:02 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-shooting-
20151004-story.html (reporting the death of a nine-year-old who was struck by a 
stray bullet while playing outside on a weekend afternoon); Kevin Rector, Two teens 
with toy gun arrested in Bolton Hill carjacking, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 22, 2015, 
6:00 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-toy-gun-
carjacking-20150922-story.html (reporting that two teenagers, ages sixteen and 
eighteen, respectively, were arrested and charged with armed robbery and assault 
after they allegedly used a toy gun in a carjacking at 7 a.m.).  But see Luke 
Broadwater, Key lawmaker questions need for new youth jail in city, BALTIMORE 
SUN (Sept. 1, 2015, 7:38 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-juvenile-jail-
20150901-story.html (reporting a ten-year low, and a fifty-seven percent drop since 
2012, in the daily average number of juveniles who are detained at the Baltimore 
City Juvenile Justice Center). 
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     Second, the city’s increase in juvenile delinquency “has been caused in part 
by the large number of minors who are permitted to remain in public places 
and in certain establishments during night hours without adult supervision, and 
during daylight hours at times when, by law, they are required to attend 
school.”178  Third, the “alarming” increase in truancy,179 coupled with the 
“rapid” decrease in academic achievement,180 has resulted in an “increase in 
failures and dropouts, frustration, malcontent, antisocial conduct, and, for 
many, a future without promise.”181 
 
b. The Baltimore City Council’s Legislative Intent 
     The curfew purports to reduce juvenile delinquency by “regulating the 
hours during which minors may remain in public places and in certain 
establishments without adult supervision, and by imposing certain duties and 
responsibilities upon the parents or other adult persons who have care and 
custody of minors.”182  The curfew further purports to ensure a basic education 
of the city’s youth: 
 
Education is the foundation of success and a productive life.  
The City of Baltimore provides the educational system and its 
staff, but the cooperation of students and their parents 
determines the productivity of the educational system.  Late 
evening activity by certain of our youth prevents them from 
concentrating in class or, even worse, causes their absence 
from class.  This, together with truancy, has risen alarmingly 
in recent years and youth is thus deprived of a necessary basic 
education.183 
     The curfew’s stated policies notwithstanding, the Baltimore City Council’s 
unstated intent is implicit in the curfew’s legislative history.184 
 
2. Implicit Policies: Encouraging Parents to Take a More Active Role in 
Raising Their Children 
     The Baltimore City Council’s interest behind the curfew extends beyond 
reducing juvenile crime, delinquency, and promoting education.  For example, 
                                                                                                                               
     The curfew, however, would not have prevented the death of a nine-year-old girl 
or the alleged carjacking.  See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
178 BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-2(2). 
179 Id. § 34-2(3). 
180 Id. § 34-2(2). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. § 34-2(4). 
183 Id. § 34-2(3). 
184 See discussion infra Part I.D.2. 
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the legislative history suggests the curfew will force parents to be more 
involved in raising their children, connect at-risk families with the social 
services they need, or both.185  The curfew’s sanctions on parents186 imply the 
curfew’s purpose is to compel parents to take a more active role in raising their 
children.187  Indeed, the Baltimore City Police Department and the Office of 
the State’s Attorney have recognized that curfew violation likely results from 
unstable home environments.188 
     A parent’s curfew violation, however, may not constitute parental abuse or 
neglect.189  Nevertheless, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services 
suggested providing “in-home services” to parents of children who are less 
than thirteen years old and who violate the curfew.190 
     Thus, the curfew implicitly seeks to link “those persons who violate the 
curfew and their families with appropriate services”191 not merely to 
                                                                                                                               
185 See sources cited infra notes 188-91. 
186 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a). 
187 See Orly Jashinsky, Article, Liberty for All? Juvenile Curfews: Always an 
Unconstitutional and Ineffective Solution, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 548-50 
(1997). 
188 See Memorandum from Ganesha Martin, Chief of Staff, Office of the Police 
Comm’r, Balt. City Police Dep’t, to the Balt. City Council (May 6, 2014) (on file 
with author) (“Minors who are found to be in violation of the curfew often times lack 
supervision created by unstable living environments.  The access to counseling 
services in lieu of a civil citation is an opportunity to link youth and their families to 
the social services they need.”); Memorandum from Greg L. Bernstein, State’s Att’y 
for Balt. City, Office of the State’s Att’y for Balt. City, to the Balt. City Council 
(Oct. 12, 2013) (on file with author) (“[C]urfew violation is often a sign of lack of 
supervision from the addiction of a parent, unstable living arrangements, or other 
problems facing the family.”). 
189 Memorandum from David Thompson, Interim Dir., Balt. City Dep’t of Social 
Servs., to the Balt. City Council (May 6, 2014) (on file with author). 
     Others, however, are concerned with child safety and parental neglect.  See 
Despite concern, Baltimore City positive about new curfew law, ABC2NEWS.COM 
(Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.abc2news.com/news/region/baltimore-city/despite-
concern-baltimore-city-positive-about-new-curfew-law (updated Aug. 12, 2014); Kai 
Reed, Baltimore leaders answer child curfew questions at forum, WBALTV.COM 
(July 22, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.wbaltv.com/news/baltimore-leaders-answer-
child-curfew-questions-at-forum/27087298; Lowell Melser, New Baltimore curfew 
law sparks controversy, WBALTV.COM (June 4, 2014, 7:40 AM), 
http://www.wbaltv.com/news/new-baltimore-curfew-law-sparks-controversy/ 
26310430; Cody L. Dorsey, Curfew law will make Baltimore safer for youths 
[Letter], BALTIMORE SUN (May 19, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-05-
19/news/bs-ed-curfew-20140519_1_baltimore-city-council-curfew-law-youths. 
190 Memorandum from David Thompson, supra note 189. 
191 Memorandum from Greg L. Bernstein, supra note 188.  See also Interview with 
Brandon Scott, Councilman, Balt. City Council, in Balt., Md. (Aug. 5, 2015) (notes 
on file with author). 
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encourage, but to compel parents to be more involved in raising their 
children.192  The curfew is, therefore, vulnerable to a constitutional challenge 
on grounds that it infringes on a parent’s fundamental right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to raise his or her children.193 
                                                                                                                               
     Opponents of the curfew further acknowledge that many parents in the city are in 
need of the social services to which the curfew is designed to connect them, but they 
argue the curfew will be ineffective in doing so.  See Gary Gately, Baltimore’s 
Newly Approved Youth Curfew Among Strictest in Nation, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (June 16, 2014), http://jjie.org/baltimores-newly-
approved-youth-curfew-among-strictest-in-nation/. 
192 The American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland contends that: 
 
[T]he proposal significantly infringes upon fundamental parental 
rights by depriving parents of discretion to raise their children in 
ways that make sense for the family. . . . There are an infinite number 
of scenarios in which the proposed expansion deprives parents of 
the ability to make perfectly healthy, appropriate and good decisions 
for their kids. 
 
Letter from Sonia Kumar, Staff Att’y, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Md., to Bernard 
C. “Jack” Young, President, Balt. City Council, and City Council, Balt., Md. (May 
12, 2014) (on file with author), available at http://www.aclu-
md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0548/curfew_letter_080614.pdf. 
193 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (opinion of Rutledge, 
J.) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents[.]”) 
(citation omitted); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (opinion of 
McReynolds, J.) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture 
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 
(1923) (opinion of McReynolds, J.) (“[T]he right of parents to engage [a teacher] to 
instruct their children . . . [is] within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”).  
Accord In re Ashley S., 431 Md. 678, 683-84 & n.1, 66 A.3d 1022, 1025 & n.1 
(2013); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 671, 948 A.2d 73, 79 (2008); 
Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 422-23, 921 A.2d 171, 181-82 (2007).  An 
analysis of this issue, however, is beyond this Comment’s scope. 
     For cases in which a court decided whether a juvenile curfew impermissibly 
infringed on a parent’s right to raise his or her children, see, for example, Hutchins v. 
District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Schleifer v. City of 
Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999); 
McCollester v. Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984); Bykofsky v. Middletown, 
401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); People v. Liccione, 964 N.Y.S. 2d 405 (J. Ct. 
2013); Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004); State v. 
T.M., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2000); City of Panora v. 
Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989); Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 426 
N.W. 2d 329 (1988); Allen v. Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557, 524 A.3d 478 
(1987); Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 212, 220 N.E. 2d 126 (1966). 
     For a discussion of a juvenile curfew ordinance’s constitutional implications on 
parental rights, see Harris, supra note 29; Brown, supra note 176; Chen, supra note 
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     Such an attack,194 however, is not the only one available.  Indeed, the 
curfew’s unstated policies and implicit intended effects195 raise additional 
questions as to its enforcement patterns, which indicate that it discriminates on 
the basis of age,196 race,197 or both. 
 
II. ANALYZING BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW UNDER THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 
     Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew implicates the Equal Protection Clause in 
two ways.  First, the curfew’s age classifications198 distinguish between those 
subject to its restrictions and those free from them.199  Second, the curfew is 
vulnerable to a challenge that the city enforces it disproportionately against 
minorities.200 
                                                                                                                               
27. 
194 The curfew’s lenient enforcement practices against parents diminish the threat 
that it is an unconstitutional infringement on parental rights.  See infra.  For example, 
police have discretion to issue a citation to parents who violate the curfew, but they 
did not do so for any of the city’s first 398 reported violations.  Telephone Interview 
with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 158 (statistics 
reported to be accurate through Feb. 21, 2015); E-mail from Sulakshana 
Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, City of 
Balt. to author (Feb. 26, 2015, 10:29 EST) (on file with author). 
     Moreover, attendance at a family counseling session at a city-approved agency is 
voluntary, because a parent can elect this option instead of receiving a citation.  See 
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a)(1); Telephone Interview 
with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra.  The city does not, 
therefore, keep records of parents who elect to attend family counseling.  Telephone 
Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra. 
     Similarly, the city does not track the number or identity of parents who are fined 
for a subsequent curfew violation.  See Interview with Brandon Scott, supra note 
191.  Thus, the absence of any citations to parents who permit their children to 
violate the curfew, and of their participation in city-approved family counseling 
programs, render the parental rights issue all but moot. 
195 See sources cited supra notes 188-91. 
196 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
197 See discussion infra Part II.C.  See also Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 
275 (“[C]urfew opponents sometimes raise the specter of racist motivation for such 
laws.”). 
198 See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-1(d), 34-3(b), 34-
3(c) (Balt. City Dep’t of Legislative Reference 2015), available at 
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/charter%20and%20Codes/code/Art%2019
%20-%20PoliceOrds.pdf.  See also discussion supra Part I.C. 
199 See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
200 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
     Critics of the curfew are especially leery of its potential for racial profiling, 
fearing it will target predominantly, or entirely, African-American neighborhoods.  
See Lauren Gambino, Outrage follows Baltimore’s ‘deeply flawed’ youth curfew 
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     However, federal and state courts often appear to avoid deciding a juvenile 
curfew under the Equal Protection Clause201—perhaps because there is no 
consensus among them as to the applicable standard of scrutiny,202 or because 
deciding cases on other grounds203 is less burdensome.204  Instead, courts are 
                                                                                                                               
decision, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/-sp-baltimore-city-council-youth-
curfew (“Some of the strongest criticism of the law has come from those who believe 
it’s shrouded in discrimination.”); Baltimore’s Tough Curfew Law Takes Effect, 
CBSLOCAL.COM (Aug. 9, 2014, 9:53 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/ 
2014/08/08/baltimores-tough-curfew-law-takes-effect-today/ (“Critics say the 
stringent bill could unfairly target African American children and teenagers.”); Justin 
Worland, Baltimore Tightens Curfew Amid Skepticism and Protests, TIME (Aug. 8, 
2014), http://time.com/3089931/baltimore-curfew/ (“Large cities, the types that 
might benefit from a curfew, [do not] have the resources to actually patrol the entire 
city.  Instead, they focus on particular neighborhoods, often leading to racial 
disparities in enforcement of the curfew, experts say.”). 
201 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1068, 1074 (5th Cir. 
1981) (limiting the unconstitutionality of a juvenile curfew to its overbreadth while 
declining to review the appellant’s First Amendment, due process, and equal 
protection challenges); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 817-18 (2d Cir. 
1976) (voiding a juvenile curfew on vagueness grounds while declining to review 
appellants’ First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges); Ashton v. 
Brown, 339 Md. 70, 93, 108, 600 A.2d 447, 458, 466 (1995) (voiding a juvenile 
curfew on vagueness grounds while remanding for trial the appellees’ due process 
and equal protection claims for civil damages under Article 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights).  See also Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors’ Fundamental 
Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1984) 
[hereinafter Assessing the Scope] (“Courts have frequently sidestepped equal 
protection objections to juvenile curfews by striking down challenged ordinances on 
grounds of vagueness or overbreadth.”).  But see, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 
(5th Cir. 1993); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D. D.C. 1989); Bykofsky v. 
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Treacy v. Municipality 
of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 216 N.J. 
Super. 557, 524 A.2d 478 (1987); People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 862, 161 
P.2d 498 (1945). 
202 See Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting 
Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 
536 (2000) (“In adjudicating juvenile curfews, courts have applied three standards of 
review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational [basis] review.”); Brian 
Privor, Article, Dusk ‘Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile 
Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 660 (1999) (“[T]hree standards have 
emerged for courts to use in determining the constitutionality of a statue [sic] under 
equal protection analysis.”).  See also discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
203 See sources and cases cited infra notes 205-10. 
204 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 46.1	  
	  
36 
more inclined to analyze a juvenile curfew under the First,205 Fourth,206 or 
Fifth207 Amendments; the overbreadth208 or vagueness209 doctrines; or the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.210 
     Still, juvenile curfews are always vulnerable to an equal protection 
attack,211 because they facially classify on the basis of age.212  Thus, 
challenging a juvenile curfew’s age-based classification is the most direct 
constitutional attack.213 
     Prior to the curfew’s enactment, several city officials questioned the 
curfew’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.214  The curfew’s 
legislative history suggests that the required constitutional “nexus”215—the 
degree to which the curfew’s classifications216 are linked to the Baltimore City 
Council’s explicit217 and implicit218 interests—is tenuous.219  However, 
whether the Equal Protection Clause requires the link to be rigid or merely 
relaxed depends on the applicable standard of scrutiny.220  The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                               
205 See, e.g., City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W. 2d 179 (Iowa 1992).  See also 
Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28. 
206 See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997), 
aff’d, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).  See also Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28. 
207 See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. 1125.  See also Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28. 
208 See Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional Standards 
& the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 VAND. L. REV. 653, 654 n.5 
(2000). 
212 See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
213 See Privor, supra note 202, at 440. 
214 See infra note 219. 
215 Memorandum from Elena R. DiPietro, Chief Solicitor, Dep’t of Law, Office of 
the Mayor of Balt., to the Balt. City Council (May 6, 2014) (on file with author). 
216 See discussion supra Parts I.C.2. 
217 See discussion supra Part I.D.1. 
218 See discussion supra Part I.D.2. 
219 Baltimore City’s chief solicitor, Elena R. DiPietro, cautioned, “Under current 
Maryland law, it is possible that [the curfew] will be upheld.  It is recommended that 
there be proof offered that the law has a nexus to the governmental purposes sought 
to be achieved.”  Memorandum from Elena R. DiPietro, supra note 215 (emphasis 
added). 
     DiPietro’s recommendation gives rise to two implications.  First, the possibility 
that a court will uphold the curfew necessarily suggests a possibility that a court will 
invalidate it.  Second, the recommendation that the City Council offer proof of a 
legal nexus between the curfew and the “governmental purposes sought to be 
achieved” suggests the City Council does not have proof of a legal nexus, or 
alternatively, that it did not have proof of a legal nexus before enacting the curfew. 
220 See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-3. 
2015] In the Street Tonight  
 
37 
has applied three different standards of review to equal protection challenges: 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.221 
A. ARTICULATING THE STANDARDS OF SCRUTINY 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
     Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of scrutiny under the equal 
protection framework.222  Courts apply strict scrutiny to government action 
which “operat[es] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class,”223 including 
those which discriminate on the basis of race.224  Government action subject 
to strict scrutiny is presumptively invalid.225  However, a suspect classification 
may nonetheless comport with the Equal Protection Clause if it is necessary to 
achieve a compelling state interest.226 
 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny 
     Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to government action that discriminates 
on the basis of gender227 or illegitimacy.228  Under intermediate scrutiny, the 
state bears the burden of proving its action is constitutional.229  However, 
government action subject to intermediate scrutiny may nonetheless comport 
with the Equal Protection Clause if it is substantially related to furthering a 
significant state interest.230 
                                                                                                                               
221 Brown, supra note 211, at 654 (“The Equal Protection Clause provides three 
possible standards for courts to use when deciding on the constitutionality of juvenile 
curfews: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.”).  That the 
Equal Protection Clause does not itself provide for the tiers of scrutiny to be applied 
to equal protection challenges should be noted; rather, the tiers of scrutiny are a 
judicially-created rubric. 
222 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES 554 
(4th ed. 2011) (“Strict scrutiny . . . is the most intensive type of judicial review.”). 
223 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam). 
224 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (opinion of Stone, J.). 
225 See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (opinion of 
Stewart, J.); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (opinion of White, J.).  
See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 554 (“[L]aws generally are declared 
unconstitutional when [strict scrutiny] is applied.”). 
226 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (opinion of Burger, 
C.J.) (citing McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) 
(opinion of Warren, C.J.). 
227 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (opinion of 
Ginsburg, J.) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
228 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.). 
229 See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 
724). 
230 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
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3. Rational Basis Review 
a. Traditional Rational Basis Review 
     Rational basis review is the most flexible standard under the equal 
protection framework.231  Courts apply rational basis review to government 
action which discriminates on the basis of age,232 among others.  Under 
rational basis review, courts defer to the legislature,233 and presume that 
government action is valid.234  Thus, a court will strike down government 
action only if it is not “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state 
interest.”235 
     Rational basis review reflects a judicial awareness that legislatures cannot 
avoid creating distinctions.236  However, critics of rational basis review argue 
the high degree of judicial deference to legislatures militates toward upholding 
discriminatory laws.237 
 
b. Rational Basis Review “With Teeth” 
     Though rational basis review permits government action to incidentally 
burden or operate to the disadvantage of a class of citizens, the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids a legislative desire to do so.238  Thus, courts will 
                                                                                                                               
231 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 694 (“The rational basis test is the minimal 
level of scrutiny that all government actions challenged under equal protection must 
meet.”). 
232 See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 106, 111 (1979) (opinion of White, J.); 
Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 313-14. 
233 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 696. 
234 See Vance, 440 U.S. at 97 (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 40 (1973)); Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 314.  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 222, at 553. 
235 Vance, 440 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
236 Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 314.  See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 
(1996) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no 
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the 
practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with 
resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.”) (citations omitted). 
237 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 696.  But see Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 
314, 316 (stating that government action “does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect[,]” because 
“[p]erfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor 
necessary.”) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). 
238 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (stating that rational basis review “ensure[s] that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened 
by the law.”).  See also R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the 
legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.”). 
2015] In the Street Tonight  
 
39 
invalidate government action that burdens or operates to the disadvantage of a 
class of citizens without advancing a legitimate state interest.239 
     In Romer v. Evans,240 for example, the Court reviewed a Colorado law that 
prohibited executive, legislative, or judicial protection of homosexuals.241  
Even under rational basis review, the Court invalidated the law because it 
operated to achieve “respect for . . . the liberties of landlords or employers who 
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”242  The Court 
concluded the law was not rationally related to its stated purpose,243 because it 
sought instead to disadvantage homosexuals.244 
     While the Court in Romer and Lawrence v. Texas245 invalidated laws within 
the context of homosexual equality, these cases demonstrate the Court’s 
propensity to apply a more stringent form of rational basis review to 
government action which is traceable to a discriminatory purpose.246  
However, constitutional review of juvenile curfew ordinances remains a 
mystery: federal and state courts have applied different standards of scrutiny 
to an equal protection challenge to juvenile curfews. 
 
4. Inconsistent Analyses of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances 
    The Supreme Court has never heard a constitutional challenge to a juvenile 
curfew ordinance on any grounds.247  Nevertheless, lower federal courts and 
state courts alike have upheld or invalidated juvenile curfews under all three 
standards of review.248  Some courts have argued a form of strict scrutiny 
                                                                                                                               
239 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36 (applying rational basis review, but striking 
down a law which disadvantaged homosexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985) (opinion of White, J.) (applying rational basis 
review, but striking down a law which disadvantaged the mentally disabled); Dep’t 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (applying 
rational basis review, but striking down a law which disadvantaged households with 
an individual unrelated to any other person in the household). 
240 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
241 Id. at 624. 
242 Id. at 635. 
243 Id. (concluding the challenged law “inflict[ed] . . . immediate, continuing, and 
real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications.”). 
244 Id. at 634-35 (concluding the challenged law was “born of animosity toward 
[homosexuals]”).  See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (hypothesizing that a Texas law which criminalized homosexual 
activity violated the Equal Protection Clause “under any standard of review.”). 
245 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
246 Cf. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 270, 932 A.2d 571, 601 (2007) (opinion of 
Harrell, J.) (“The test to evaluate whether a facially gender-neutral statute 
discriminates on the basis of sex is whether the law can be traced to a discriminatory 
purpose.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
247 See Privor, supra note 202, at 418-19. 
248 See Chudy, supra note 202, at 555 & n.290. 
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should be applied;249 others have advocated for rational basis review;250 and 
some commentators have argued intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard.251 
 
B. THE CURFEW’S AGE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: COMPARING RATIONAL 
BASIS REVIEW AGAINST INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
     Supreme Court precedent dictates that rational basis review is the 
appropriate standard to which Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew ordinance 
must be subjected, insofar as the curfew facially classifies on the basis of 
age.252  The threshold argument, therefore, centers on whether the curfew’s 
age-based classification should be subject to a form of rational basis review or 
intermediate scrutiny.253  The appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply to the 
curfew’s age-based classification is an important issue;254 it likely will 
determine the curfew’s constitutional validity. 
 
1. Legitimate and Important Government Interests: Reducing Juvenile 
Crime and Victimization 
     The Supreme Court has recognized that minors’ well-being is a compelling 
state interest.255  Within the context of a juvenile curfew, protecting a minor’s 
“well-being” can be narrowed to mean reducing juvenile crime and juvenile 
                                                                                                                               
249 See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Appeal 
in Maricopa Cnty., 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); City of Maquoketa v. 
Russell, 484 N.W. 2d 179 (Iowa 1992); Brown v. Ashton, 93 Md. App. 25, 611 A.2d 
599 (1992), rev’d, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995).  See also Benjamin C. Sasse, 
Note, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights of Juveniles, 50 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 681, 711 (2000) (citations omitted). 
250 See, e.g., In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Col. 1989); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 
N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989). 
251 See, e.g. Chudy, supra note 202, at 569-76. 
252 See cases cited supra note 232. 
253 Cf. Chudy, supra note 202, at 569-76. 
254 See id. at 554. 
255 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 775-76 (1982) (opinion of White, J.) 
(“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in ‘safeguarding 
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’ ”) (citing 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)); Ginsburg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (“[T]he State has 
an interest ‘to protect the welfare of children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded 
from abuses’ which might prevent their ‘growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens.’ ”) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 
(1944)); Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (“A democratic society rests, for its continuance, 
upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as 
citizens.”). 
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victimization.256  Thus, the Baltimore City Council’s interest in reducing 
juvenile crime and juvenile victimization is a significant and legitimate state 
interest under intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review, respectively.257 
     The sole relevant issue, then, is to what degree does the curfew’s age 
classification achieves its legislative purpose?  Still, the City Council’s “claim 
of paternal concern should not deter the courts from critically examining” the 
curfew’s age-based classification.258 
 
2. Applying Rational Basis Review 
     The curfew baldly asserts the high volume and increase in severity of 
crimes committed by juveniles,259 but the legislative history does not 
substantiate this claim.  Moreover, studies which demonstrate the effects of a 
juvenile curfew on juvenile crime and victimization are few.260  Nevertheless, 
the City Council’s assertion that it “suffer[s] from rampant juvenile crime and 
victimization . . . may not appear entirely unfounded.”261 
     Contrarily, anchoring the curfew’s age-based classifications to the 
statistical propensity for minors to commit crimes or become victims of them 
creates a dangerous prospect that the curfew will be selectively enforced.262  
African-Americans, for example, commit a statistically disproportionate 
percentage of crimes.263  Nevertheless, the few courts264 which have decided 
an equal protection challenge to a juvenile curfew under rational basis review 
have upheld the curfew.265 
                                                                                                                               
256 See Chudy, supra note 202, at 557. 
257 See Privor, supra note 202, at 455 (“The community’s desire to reduce juvenile 
crime and victimization provides curfew ordinances with an unassailable 
objective.”). 
258 Assessing the Scope, supra note 201, at 1168-69 (citing Irene Merker Rosenberg, 
The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to 
the Not so Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 703-05 (1980)). 
259 “An emergency has been created by a substantial increase in the number and in 
the seriousness of crimes committed by minors against persons and property within 
the City, and this has created a menace to the preservation of public peace, safety, 
health, morals, and welfare.”  BALT., MD. CODE – UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 
34-2. 
260 See Privor, supra note 202, at 464. 
261 See id. at 457 (“The community’s desire to reduce juvenile crime and 
victimization provides curfew ordinances with an unassailable objective.”). 
262 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
263 Privor, supra note 202, at 461 & n.263 (stating that, in 1995, African-Americans 
were arrested for 35.7 percent of all serious crimes while accounting for a mere 12.6 
percent of the population in the United States) (citations omitted). 
264 See Brown, supra note 211, at 662 (“Few courts have used the rational basis 
standard to review juvenile curfew ordinances.”). 
265 See, e.g., Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266; In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 223-24; City of 
Panora, 445 N.W. 2d at 368-70. 
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     Given the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating that curfews are 
rationally related to reducing juvenile crime and victimization, and the 
persuasive authority from federal and state courts, a Maryland court likely will 
uphold Baltimore’s juvenile curfew ordinance under rational basis review.  
However, doubt remains that the curfew will be effective in achieving its stated 
legislative purposes.266  Whether Baltimore’s curfew satisfies intermediate 
scrutiny is less clear. 
 
3. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny 
     Some commentators have suggested the time restrictions and age 
classifications do not correlate with reducing juvenile crime or juvenile 
victimization.267  For example, the court in Nunez v. City of San Diego268 
considered evidence of juvenile crime and victimization for the year in which 
San Diego began to enforce its curfew more aggressively.269  The evidence 
demonstrated that merely fifteen percent of arrests were for violent juvenile 
crimes, and that juvenile victimization increased, during curfew hours.270  The 
court in Nunez struck down the curfew under strict scrutiny,271 holding the 
curfew was “not narrowly tailored to minimize the burden on minors’ 
fundamental constitutional rights.”272  The Nunez court further concluded that 
the City of San Diego “established some nexus between the curfew and its 
compelling interest of reducing juvenile crime and victimization.”273 
     In contrast to Nunez, the court in Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,274 
considered evidence of a high juvenile crime rate and a substantial increase in 
juvenile victimization.  In Charlottesville, Virginia, juveniles committed 
eighty-five percent of serious crimes in 1996.275  Moreover, juvenile crime 
between 11 p.m. and 6 p.m. increased by thirty-eight percent in 1995, and by 
an additional ten percent in 1996.276  The court in Schleifer upheld the curfew 
under intermediate scrutiny,277 holding the curfew “represent[ed] the least 
                                                                                                                               
266 See Assessing the Scope, supra note 201, at 1177 n.69 (“[T]here is considerable 
doubt that juvenile curfews are actually effective in reducing juvenile crime.”) 
(citations omitted). 
267 See, e.g., Chudy, supra note 202, at 558 (discussing defects in “time dimension” 
and “age classifications”). 
268 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997). 
269 In 1994, San Diego adopted a resolution to aggressively enforce its curfew, which 
it had enacted in 1947.  Id. at 946, 938-39. 
270 Id. at 947. 
271 Id. at 946. 
272 Id. at 952. 
273 Id. at 948 (emphasis added). 
274 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998). 
275 Id. at 850. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 847. 
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restrictive means to advance Charlottesville’s” interest in reducing juvenile 
crime and victimization.278  Accordingly, the court posited that the curfew also 
would satisfy strict scrutiny.279 
     The Nunez and Schleifer courts reached opposite holdings under different 
standards of scrutiny.  Perhaps the stark contrast in statistical data 
demonstrating the rate of juvenile crime and victimization can reconcile these 
two holdings.  Nevertheless, “statistical problems related to age 
classifications” undermine the position that juvenile curfews effectively 
reduce juvenile crime.280 
     In Hutchins v. District of Columbia,281 for example, the court considered 
reports demonstrating juveniles to whom a Washington, D.C., curfew did not 
apply—those who were at least seventeen years old—comprised forty-two 
percent of all “juvenile referrals” between 1990 and 1994.282  The presumption 
is, therefore, that juveniles who were sixteen years and under comprised fifty-
eight percent of the city’s juvenile referrals.  The reports, however, failed to 
indicate the percentage of the city’s population which the curfew affected.283 
     The alarming rates of juvenile crime and victimization constitutionally 
justified the imposition of a curfew in Schleifer.  But statistical evidence which 
demonstrates a more tenuous relationship between a curfew’s age-based 
classification and a reduction in juvenile crime and victimization may not be 
“substantially related” to the extent that it satisfies intermediate scrutiny. 
 
4. Assessing the Curfew’s Effects on Reducing Juvenile Crime and 
Victimization 
     The Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice reported 398 curfew violations—
226 for the daytime curfew and 172 for the nighttime curfew—in the first 
seven months since the curfew took effect.284  Among the 398 total violations, 
only twenty-seven were repeat offenses285—a recidivism rate of only 7.3 
percent.  Moreover, the Office of the Mayor reported 120 curfew violations 
during the first month in which the curfew was enforced,286 but just 278 
                                                                                                                               
278 Id. at 852. 
279 Id. 
280 Chudy, supra note 202, at 558. 
281 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
282 Id. at 542-45. 
283 Id.  
284 E-mail from Sulakshana Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s Office on 
Criminal Justice, City of Balt. to author (Feb. 26, 2015, 10:29 EST) (on file with 
author). 
285 Id. 
286 Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Balt. City, Mayor Rawlings-Blake Releases 
Curfew Violation Numbers (Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with author), available at 
http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2014-09-11-curfew-violation-
numbers-released. 
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violations during the subsequent six months287—a 61.4 percent decline in the 
rate at which minors are violating the curfew.  The low recidivism rate and a 
marked drop-off in the quantity of curfew violations suggests the curfew 
effectively keeps children off the streets. 
     These figures, however, are not necessarily indicative of the curfew’s 
efficacy.  They do not account for the number of number of juveniles who 
violate the curfew during the commission of a crime.  In such instances, police 
will charge the minor with a crime, but will not issue a citation for violating 
the curfew.288 
     Moreover, these figures, though facially indicative of a reduction in the 
quantity of curfew violations, do not represent the degree or quality of parental 
supervision.  Assuming the curfew was enacted—at least in part—to 
encourage or compel parents to take a more active role in raising their children, 
these figures do not demonstrate the degree to which enforcing the curfew has 
succeeded.289 
     Analyzing the curfew’s age-based classification under rational basis review 
and intermediate scrutiny hinge on whether the daytime and night curfews will 
achieve the Baltimore City Council’s interests in reducing juvenile crime and 
delinquency.  Strict scrutiny, however, requires a more searching inquiry into 
the curfew’s underlying purposes. 
 
C. THE CURFEW’S RACE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: TRIGGERING STRICT 
SCRUTINY 
     Chief among the Fourteenth Amendment’s purposes “is the prevention of 
official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”290  Baltimore City’s 
juvenile curfew is facially neutral with respect to race,291 but there is a 
possibility that it is “racist in intent or execution, or at least unfairly 
burdensome to racial minorities.”292 
                                                                                                                               
287 Compare id., with E-mail from Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 284. 
288 Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese, Dir., Mayor’s Office on Criminal 
Justice, City of Balt., and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s 
Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt. (Feb. 25, 2015). 
289 See supra notes 171, 194 and accompanying text. 
290 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (opinion of White, J.).  See also 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.”); In re Legislative Districting of State, 299 Md. 658, 673, 475 A.2d 428, 
435 (1982) (per curiam). 
291 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, subtit. 34. 
292 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), Justice Matthews stated: 
 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in 
appearance, . . . if it is applied and administered . . . with an evil 
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and 
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1. Triggering Strict Scrutiny for Facially Neutral Laws 
     There are two components to triggering strict scrutiny for a facially neutral 
law: proving the law’s purpose and its effects are racially discriminatory.293  
The Supreme Court has not expressly stated that triggering strict scrutiny 
requires demonstrating a facially neutral law’s racially discriminatory 
purposes and effects.294  However, Washington v. Davis295 and Palmer v. 
Thompson,296 read together, suggest that demonstrating both discriminatory 
purpose and effects is necessary to trigger strict scrutiny.297  Yet, such a 
                                                                                                                               
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, 
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within 
the prohibition of the Constitution. 
Id. at 373-374.  See also Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion Over 
Minor Rights, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2400, 2404 (2005) (citing Privor, supra note 202, 
at 420-21 (“[S]ome courts may be only a small step away from accepting selective 
enforcement of effectively race-based curfews[.]”)); Note, Juvenile Curfews and 
Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1707 (1994) 
(“Once curfews are imposed, the burden falls disproportionately on minority 
individuals and communities.”). 
293 Compare McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(stating a defendant eligible to receive the death penalty “would have to prove the 
Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an 
anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”) (emphasis in original), and Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (“[O]nly if there is 
purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”) 
(citations omitted), with Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant[.]”), and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 266 (1971) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he reality is that the impact of the city's act falls on the minority. . . . 
[T]here are deep and troubling effects on the racial minority that should give us all 
pause.”). 
294 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 730. 
295 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
296 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (opinion of Black, J.). 
297 In Davis, Justice White stated: “Disproportionate impact . . . is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination[.] . . . Standing alone, it does not 
trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny[.] 
. . . ”  Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
 In Palmer, Justice Black stated: 
 
[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate 
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who 
voted for it. . . . If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than 
because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid 
as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for 
different reasons. 
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distillation of Davis and Palmer,298 undermines the original purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause—to prevent government action from discriminating 
on the basis of race.299 
     The Equal Protection Clause forbids purposeful discrimination.  
Accordingly, a law is constitutionally invalid when its race-based 
classifications are unnecessary to achieve a compelling state interest.300  Thus, 
a legislative body cannot have a compelling state interest in a law when the 
law’s purpose is to discriminate on the basis of race, rather than to use a race-
based classification to achieve some other compelling state interest.301 
     Even if the face of a law does not reveal a racially discriminatory purpose, 
the law’s racially disproportionate effects are prima facie evidence of a 
legislative body’s constitutionally impermissible objective.302  Because the 
distinctions between the two are vague,303 proving a racially discriminatory 





                                                                                                                               
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25. 
298 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (opinion of 
Rehnquist, C.J.) (stating that “[t]he claimant must demonstrate” discriminatory effect 
and purpose of the race-based prosecution to prove an equal protection violation). 
299 See cases cited supra notes 290, 292, and accompanying text. 
300 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 730. 
301 See id. 
302 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“The impact of the official action—whether it ‘bears 
more heavily on one race than another,’—may provide an important starting point.”) 
(quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242). See also Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced 
Government Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial 
Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1111 (1978) (“[A] showing of 
significant disproportionate disadvantage to a racial minority group, without more, 
gives rise to an inference that the action may have been taken or at least maintained 
or continued with knowledge that such groups would be relatively disadvantaged. . . 
[I]t raises a possibility sufficient to oblige the government to come forward with a 
credible explanation showing that the action was (or would have been) taken apart 
from prejudice.”). 
303 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he line between 
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not . . . bright.”). 
304 See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.  “First, it is extremely difficult for a court to 
ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a 
legislative enactment.”  Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 
(1968) (opinion of Warren, C.J.)).  “Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a 
judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters.”  Id. 
at 225. 
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2. Proving Racially Discriminatory Purpose 
     A statistical pattern of racially discriminatory effect might be apparent to 
the extent that it cannot be explained “on grounds other than race,”305 though 
“such cases are rare.”306  The law’s historical background,307 the “sequence of 
events leading up to”308 its promulgation,309 and the legislative or 
administrative history are relevant to proving a racially discriminatory 
purpose.310 
     A challenge to a law on the grounds of impermissible race discrimination 
that proves both racially discriminatory effect and purpose places the burden 
of proof on the government.311  The government must then show it would have 
promulgated the challenged law absent a racially discriminatory purpose.312  
The legislative history of Baltimore’s curfew does not mention race;313 
therefore proving a racially discriminatory purpose underlies the curfew is 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.  Thus, triggering strict scrutiny relies 
upon the curfew’s racially discriminatory effects. 
 
3. Proving Racially Discriminatory Impact 
a. The Youth Connection Centers: “The pattern surrounding curfew 
laws has been to enact them in blighted, poor, urban areas[.]”314 
     Baltimore City operates two Youth Connection Centers.315  The Lillian 
Jones Recreation Center316 is located in the Sandtown-Winchester 
neighborhood in West Baltimore; Collington Square Community Recreation 
Center317 is located in the Broadway East neighborhood in East Baltimore.  
                                                                                                                               
305 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted). 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 267 (citations omitted). 
308 Id. 
309 Id. (citations omitted). 
310 Id. at 267. 
311 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 (“When there is a proof that a 
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial 
deference is no longer justified.”). 
312 See id. at 270 n.21 (stating in dicta that “[s]uch proof would, however, have 
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have 
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”). 
313 See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, subtit. 34.  See 
also sources cited supra notes 188-91. 
314 Orly Jashinsky, Liberty for All? Juvenile Curfews: Always An Unconstitutional 
and Ineffective Solution, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 574 (2007). 
315 Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Balt. City, supra note 286. 
316 1301 North Stricker Street.  Id. 
317 1409 North Patterson Park Avenue.  Id. 
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Both neighborhoods are noted for their economic depression, high crime rates, 
and urban decay. 
     In Sandtown-Winchester and the eight bordering neighborhoods,318 97.9 
percent of the residents are of a minority race, including 95.6 percent who are 
African-American; 2.1 percent are white; 25.6 percent are seventeen years old 
or younger; and a single parent is at the head of 34.7 percent of the 
households.319  In Broadway East and the six bordering neighborhoods,320 96.5  
percent of the residents are of a minority race, including 93.3 percent who are 
African-American; 3.5 percent are white; 26.7 percent are seventeen years old 
or younger; and a single parent is at the head of 34.6 percent of the 
households.321  Collectively, in the two neighborhoods in which Baltimore 
City operates its Youth Connection Centers, 97.4 percent of the residents are 
of a minority race, including 94.8 percent who are African-American; 2.6 
percent are white; 26.0 percent are seventeen years old or younger; and a single 
parent is at the head of 34.7 percent of the households.322 
 
b. Enforcing the Curfew Against Minority Children 
     Any success the curfew might have in achieving its purposes is not without 
racial its disproportions.  Among 371 unique curfew violators, 314 were black 
                                                                                                                               
318 Penn North, Druid Heights, Upton, Harlem Park, Midtown-Edmonson, 
Bridgewood/Greenlawn, Easterwood, and Mondawmin. 
319 See ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD 
HEALTH PROFILE: SANDTOWN-WINCHESTER/HARLEM PARK 3-4 (2011), available at 
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/47%20Sandtown.pdf; ALISA AMES 
ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: PENN 
NORTH/RESERVOIR HILL 3-4 (2011), available at http://health.baltimorecity.gov/ 
sites/default/files/43%20Penn%20North.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY 
HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: GREATER MONDAWMIN 3-4 
(2011), available at http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/21%20Greater 
%20Mondawmin.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: GREATER ROSEMONT 3-4 (2011), available at 
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/ 23%20Greater%20Rosemont.pdf. 
320 Clifton Park, Berea, Biddle Street, Middle East, Gay Street, and Oliver. 
321 See ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD 
HEALTH PROFILE: GREENMOUNT EAST 3-4 (2011), available at http://health. 
baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/24%20Greenmount.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., 
BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: CLIFTON-
BEREA 3-4 (2011), available at http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/10% 
20Clifton.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: PERKINS/MIDDLE EAST 3-4 (2011), available at 
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/44%20Perkins.pdf; ALISA AMES ET 
AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: 
MADISON/EAST END 3-4 (2011), available at 
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/33%20Madison.pdf. 
322 See sources cited supra notes 319 and 321. 
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and forty were white.323  Black curfew violators, therefore, account for 84.6 
percent of all curfew violations, whereas white curfew violators account for 
only 10.8 percent. 
     The empirical evidence demonstrated is analogous to that in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins.324  The Supreme Court in Yick Wo struck down a San Francisco 
ordinance which prohibited laundries from being located in wooden buildings, 
unless a waiver was obtained.325  All 240 Chinese-Americans who applied for 
the waiver were denied.  Meanwhile, seventy-nine of eighty applications for 
waiver by non-Chinese individuals were accepted. 
     One reading of Yick Wo is that 99.6 percent of denied applications belonged 
to Chinese-Americans.  Another reading of Yick Wo is that the restriction was 
enforced against 75.0 percent of those subject to the ordinance.  The lower 
figure is more analogous to Baltimore City’s curfew, which, the numbers 
demonstrate, is five times more likely to burden a black child than a child of 
another race. 
     Race neutrality on the curfew’s face notwithstanding, the empirical 
disparities are–or should be, at least–sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.  
Proving the curfew’s racially discriminatory purpose from its effects on 
minorities, particularly African-Americans, is a heavy burden to carry.  
Indeed, more data is needed.  Nevertheless, an inquiry into the issue, and into 
whether enforcing the curfew achieves the Baltimore City Council’s interests, 
will ensure the curfew comports with the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
III. APPLYING THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK TO BALTIMORE 
CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW 
     The constitutional validity of Baltimore City’s curfew centers on the 
threshold issues for each of the curfew’s classifications.  First, whether the 
curfew’s age-based classifications should be subject to intermediate scrutiny, 
rational basis review “with teeth,” or traditional rational basis review.  Second, 
whether the racially disproportionate effects apparent from the curfew’s 
enforcement patterns trigger strict scrutiny.  Judicial disposition of the 
threshold issue will all but dictate whether the curfew will survive an equal 
protection attack.326 
     The dispositive issue will be the degree to which the daytime and nighttime 
curfews advance or achieve the Baltimore City Council’s explicit interests— 
reducing juvenile crime, victimization, and delinquency—and its implicit 
                                                                                                                               
323 E-mail from Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 284.   Seventeen violators were 
of an unidentified race.  Id. 
324 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (opinion of Matthews, J.). 
325 Id. at 374. 
326 See Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting 
Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 
554 (2000). 
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interests—encouraging parents to take a more proactive role in raising their 
children. 
 
A. RECONCILING THE CURFEW’S CLASSIFICATIONS WITH THE STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW 
     Determining the constitutional validity of the curfew’s age- and race-based 
classifications327 are separate analyses.328  Indeed, they are subject to different 
standards of scrutiny.329  With respect to the curfew’s age-based 
classifications, a balance between traditional rational basis review and rational 
basis review “with teeth”330 cannot discount the burdens and disadvantages 
that are unique to African-American children and their parents.331 
     Choosing the most appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply to the curfew’s 
age-based classifications requires more evidence of the curfew’s racially 
disproportionate effects.332  Considering the empirical evidence currently 
                                                                                                                               
327 See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.  See also BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED 
ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-1(d), 34-3(b), 34-3(c) (Balt. City Dep’t of Legislative 
Reference 2015), available at 
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/charter%20and%20Codes/code/Art%2019
%20-%20PoliceOrds.pdf. 
328 See discussion supra Parts II.A.1-3. 
329 Compare discussion supra Part II.A.1., with discussion supra Part II.A.3.a.. 
330 Compare discussion supra Part II.A.3.a., with discussion supra Part II.a.3.b. 
331 See Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: 
Sending Messages, but What Kind and To Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 10 
(“[C]ritics express concern that laws will be enforced mostly against poor, single 
parents, especially African-American women.”) (citations omitted).  Cf. Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
332 Section 34-10 provides: 
 
The Mayor and City Council shall continue evaluating and updating 
this subtitle through methods including but not limited to: 
 
(1) Annually, on or before February 1 of each year, the Police 
Commissioner must report to the Mayor and City Council: 
 
(i) on the effect of this subtitle on crimes committed by and 
against minors; 
 
(ii) the number of warnings issued and arrests of minors, 
parents, and operators hereunder; and 
 
(iii) such other information as the Mayor and City Council 
may request. 
 
(2) On a regular basis, the Mayor and City Council shall receive 
informal requests of all exceptional cases hereunder and advisory 
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available,333 a heightened form of rational basis review is the most appropriate 
standard under which the curfew must be reviewed.334  If, on the other hand, 
any additional evidence is sufficient to prove a racially discriminatory purpose 
behind the curfew, strict scrutiny is the appropriate—indeed, the required—
standard.335  Under any standard of review, the dispositive issue is the degree 
to which the classification advances the curfew’s purposes. 
 
B. ACCURATELY ASSESSING REDUCTIONS IN JUVENILE CRIME AND 
VICTIMIZATION 
     The quantity of curfew violations has decreased markedly since the curfew 
took effect in August 2014.336  However, the police department’s enforcement 
strategies do not include specifically targeting minors.337  Instead, police detain 
a minor believed to be in violation of the curfew merely during the course of 
their routine patrol.338   
     Moreover, police have not issued a single citation to a parent,339 nor does 
the city keep records of parents who voluntarily attend family counseling 
sessions.340  The lack of data pertaining to the curfew’s enforcement creates 
two interrelated impossibilities. 
     First, ascertaining the “true” number of curfew violations on a daily, 
weekly, or monthly basis is impossible.341  This failure, in addition to the City 
                                                                                                                               
opinions for consideration in further updating and continuing 
evaluate of this subtitle. 
 
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-10. 
     The author’s repeated attempts to obtain information required to be submitted to 
the mayor have proved fruitless. 
333 See discussion supra Part II.B.4. 
334 Rational basis review “with teeth” reflects a compromise between traditional 
rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny.  See Chudy, supra note 326, at 569-
76 (arguing intermediate scrutiny is the standard of review applicable in the context 
of a juvenile curfew ordinance).  See also discussion supra Parts II.A.2 and II.A.3.a.  
335 See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
336 Compare Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Balt. City, Mayor Rawlings-
Blake Releases Curfew Violation Numbers (Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with author), 
available at http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2014-09-11-curfew-
violation-numbers-released, with Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese, Dir., 
Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt., and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, 
Program Coordinator, Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt. (Feb. 25, 
2015). 





341 See also Harris, supra note 331, at 22 (suggesting curfews are rarely or never 
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Council’s implicit legislative policies,342 further suggests the curfew is less 
about reductions in juvenile crime and victimization, and more about forcing 
parents to use city-approved resources.343 
     The true purpose behind the curfew inevitably links to the second 
impossibility inherent in the curfew’s enforcement strategy.  The city cannot 
determine the degree to which parental supervision has improved.  Here, as 
with deciding on an appropriate standing of scrutiny, more data is needed, but 
is unavailable.344 
     The city, in order to assess accurately whether its curfew advances its 
explicit and implicit goals, must not rely on merely anecdotal evidence.345  
Instead, it must acquire conclusive data showing first, a pre- and post-curfew 
statistical comparison of the juvenile crime and victimization rates,346 and the 
rate at which school-aged children are absent from school.  Second, acquired 
data must conclusively show a clear point at which parents begin to take a 
more proactive role in raising their children.347 
                                                                                                                               
enforced). 
342 See discussion supra Part I.D.2. 
343 See Interview with Brandon Scott, Councilman, Balt. City Council, in Balt., Md. 
(Aug. 5, 2015) (notes on file with author); BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES 
art. 19, § 34-9(a)(1)(i). 
344 See Interview with Brandon Scott, supra note 343. 
345 “I've been there and seen the [four]-year-old come in.  I've had a little child tell 
me they got caught on purpose so they can eat.  I've seen how young these children 
are [who] come into the center [who] are out unaccompanied, and that is 
unacceptable.”  Julia Botero, For Their Own Good? New Curfew Sends Baltimore 
Kids Home Early, NPR (Aug. 31, 2014, 1:33 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/08/31/344643559/for-their-own-good-new-curfew-sends-
baltimore-kids-home-early (quoting Brandon Scott, the city councilman who 
sponsored the curfew bill). 
346 Violent crimes and juvenile arrests rates in Baltimore are declining.  Lauren 
Gambino, Outrage follows Baltimore’s ‘deeply flawed’ youth curfew decision, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/-sp-baltimore-city-council-youth-
curfew.  Nevertheless, high rates of drug crimes and gang violence—more 
pronounced in the city’s minority and low-income neighborhoods—continue to 
plague the city.  Id. 
347 Brian Privor, Article, Dusk ‘Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 464 (1999) (explaining that 
empirical studies concluding whether juvenile curfews effectively reduce crime and 
victimization are scant). 
     For a current, comprehensive report showing juvenile crime and victimization data 
on a national scale, see NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND 
VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT (Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds., 
2014) (providing the most reliable information available through 2010), available at 
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/NR2014.pdf. 
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     Such data, however, is useful only to the extent that an equal protection 
analysis of the curfew will subject it to a standard of review other than strict 
scrutiny.  Indeed, the curfew is not the only means by which the city can reduce 
juvenile crime and victimization. 
 
C. PROPOSING ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ADVANCE OR ACHIEVE THE 
CURFEW’S UNDERLYING POLICIES 
     The few studies and other research that are available do little to show the 
effects of juvenile curfews on reducing juvenile crime and victimization.348  
One national study concluded violent crime will decrease by a mere ten 
percent in the first year, with only marginal decreases in subsequent years.349  
Other studies demonstrate that there is no correlation between curfews and a 
reduction in juvenile crime and victimization.350  Given the uncertainties 
surrounding the efficacy of juvenile curfews, the Baltimore City Council must 
consider a host of alternative means by which it can more effectively advance 




                                                                                                                               
348 See generally Kenneth Adams, Cynthia M. Lum, Anthony Petrosino, & David 
Weisburd, Assessing Systematic Evidence in Crime and Justice: Methodological 
Concerns and Empirical Outcomes (sec. 2), 587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 136 (2003).  See also Gambino, supra note 346 (“[Curfews] are a tool in a 
toolbox that needs to include social services, access to education, access to economic 
improvement and healthcare, because the youth who are most at risk for committing 
crimes are living in communities that are disenfranchised.”) (quoting Nadine 
Connell, assistant professor of criminology at the University of Texas at Dallas); 
Justin Worland, Baltimore Tightens Curfew Amid Skepticism and Protests, TIME 
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3089931/baltimore-curfew/ (“It does[ not] reduce 
crime. It does[ not] make communities safer. In fact what it might do is contribute to 
the negative relationship between law enforcement and the communities they[ are] 
looking to serve.”) (quoting Marie Williams, Executive Director of the Coalition for 
Juvenile Justice); Emma Fitzsimmons, Baltimore Joins Cities Toughening Curfews, 
Citing Safety but Eliciting Concern, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014), http://www.nytime 
s.com/2014/06/22/us/baltimore-joins-cities-toughening-curfews-citing-safety-but-
eliciting-concern.html (“These are usually short-term measures.  They tend to have 
bursts of enforcement, and then they tend to give up.”) (quoting Patrick Kline, an 
economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, who has studied 
curfew laws). 
349 See Botero, supra note 345. 
350 See Gambino, supra note 346; Yvonne Wenger & Colin Campbell, Baltimore's 
new curfew takes effect Friday, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-07/news/bs-md-ci-curfew-effective-
20140806_1_curfew-collington-square-recreation-center-sandtown-winchester. 
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1. Employing the Kids 
     Baltimore City and “leaders of the business and philanthropic 
communities”351 sponsor YouthWorks,352 an initiative designed to offer 
summer jobs to the city’s youth.353  The program’s popularity, wide-ranging 
opportunities, and its benefactors’ financial commitment ensure its continued 
success, which has been “nationally-recognized.”354 
     YouthWorks seeks to provide 5,000 of the city’s teenagers and young 
adults with paid summer employment opportunities.355  In 2015, however, a 
record 8,000 hopeful participants registered.356  Perhaps YouthWorks’ 
diversity of employment opportunities drives its popularity. 
     YouthWorks offers jobs in the professional and civil service industries, 
including in the health,357 journalism,358 legal,359 and public sectors.360  Other 
fields include construction,361 higher education,362 science and technology,363 
and tourism and hospitality.364 
     Moreover, eight city government agencies365 and a number of private and 
non-profit business entities fund the program.366  Thus, the joint financial 
commitment ensures the city-sponsored program will continue to operate. 
                                                                                                                               
351 Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Balt., Mayor Rawlings-Blake 
Announces Expansion of Summer Jobs Program for Baltimore City Youth (June 24, 
2015) (on file with author), available at http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-
releases/2015-06-24-mayor-rawlings-blake-announces-expansion-summer-jobs-
program. 
352 For additional information about YouthWorks, see YOUTHWORKS, 
https://youthworks.oedworks.com/. 
353 See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Balt., supra note 351. 
354 See id. 
355 See id. 
356 See id. 
357 Johns Hopkins Hospital and Health Systems, and Mercy Medical Center.  See id. 
358 Baltimore Sun Media Group.  See id. 
359 Law Firm of Schlachman, Belsky and Weiner.  See Press Release, Office of the 
Mayor, City of Balt., supra note 351. 
360 Baltimore City Police Department and the Enoch Pratt Free Library.  See id.  
361 Whiting Turner.  See id. 
362 Johns Hopkins University and Maryland Institute College of Art.  See id. 
363 Space Telescope Science Institute and the Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources.  See id. 
364 Royal Sonesta Harbor Court Hotel and the National Aquarium.  See id. 
365 Baltimore City Department of Public Works, Baltimore City Health Department, 
Baltimore City Housing Authority, Baltimore City Police Department, Office of 
Civil Rights and Wage Enforcement, Baltimore City Council President’s Office, 
Baltimore City Council Sharon Middleton District #6, and Baltimore City Council 
Helen Holton District #8.  See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Balt., 
supra note 351. 
366 See id. 
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2. Incorporating the Curfew into the Juvenile Justice System 
     Assuming that enforcement of Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew cannot 
reduce juvenile crime and victimization, or decrease delinquency from school, 
then the juvenile crime, victimization, and delinquency rates will remain 
steady—or worse, they will rise.  Those rates will continue to propel minors 
into the city’s juvenile justice system, and courts inevitably will sentence them 
to a term of probation. 
     Imposing the curfew’s daytime and nighttime restrictions as a condition of 
a juvenile’s probation will not guarantee a drop in juvenile crime, 
victimization, or delinquency.  More importantly, however, imposing the 
curfew’s restrictions on a juvenile probationer will not unduly burden law-
abiding children, who already live in an increasingly violent city,367 and who 
regularly attend school. 
 
3. Continuing to Develop Robust Recreation Programs 
     The Baltimore City Council must allocate money and other resources to 
support neighborhood recreation centers368 and competitive sports leagues for 
children who want or need a constructive activity in which they can participate 
when they are not in school. 
     Baltimore City Councilman Carl Stokes, who voted against the curfew,369 
argued the city should place greater emphasis on developing programs rather 
than imposing punitive measures.370  Competitive sports leagues, for example, 
                                                                                                                               
367 See supra note 177. 
368 Even though some are supportive of the policies underlying the curfew, they 
doubt it would be necessary if the city appropriated more resources to its recreation 
centers and after-school and summer activities for children.  See Wenger & 
Campbell, supra note 350.   
     In 2013, Baltimore City mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake closed twenty of the 
city’s fifty-five recreation centers.  See Gary Gately, Baltimore’s Newly Approved 
Youth Curfew Among Strictest in Nation, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE (June 16, 2014), http://jjie.org/baltimores-newly-approved-youth-curfew-
among-strictest-in-nation/.  But cf. Yvonne Wenger, Rawlings-Blake outlines four 
broad goals for remainder of term, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 14, 2015 7:13 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-rawlings-
blake-interview-20150914-story.html (reporting mayor Rawlings-Blake’s goal to 
finance $136 million in improvements to community recreation centers and pools). 
369 See Luke Broadwater, Council approves tough new curfew for city youths, 
BALTIMORE SUN (May 12, 2014, 8:24 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ 
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-curfew-20140512-story.html. 
370 See Baltimore’s Tough Curfew Law Takes Effect, CBSLOCAL.COM (Aug. 8, 2014, 
6:22 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/08/08/baltimores-tough-curfew-law-
takes-effect-today/ (updated Aug. 9, 2014, 9:53 AM). 
     Stokes went on the record calling the curfew “a false effort to avoid the more 
obvious proactive methods we should be using to engage young people, encourage 
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are structured environments which would enrich the lives of the city’s youth 
while simultaneously providing the adult supervision the curfew seeks to 
encourage.371  These proposals, and others,372 present little risk, because they 
have already proved to be effective. 
 
4. Adopting Boston’s Strategy 
 
     Boston has reduced juvenile crime by creating a “community-based 
approach” to occupy minors’ time with alternative activities.373  Boston’s 
model is a three-pronged attack on juvenile crime and victimization: 
prevention, intervention, and enforcement. 374 
     Boston’s prevention strategy, for example, operates programs which 
provide employment opportunities375 for the city’s youth.376  Moreover, 
several of Boston’s community-based initiatives target violent behavior 
among children, and seek to prevent and eliminate it.377  When children find 
themselves in court after engaging in violent behavior, probation officers take 
a proactive approach to enforce the terms of juvenile offenders’ probation.378  
                                                                                                                               
them and give them opportunities for growth.”  Id.  Stokes further pleaded “[t]he 
conversation should be about opportunities for young people, not about what 
punishment we give a few young people.”  See Lowell Melser, New Baltimore 
curfew law sparks controversy, WBALTV.COM (June 4, 2014, 7:40 AM), 
http://www.wbaltv.com/news/new-baltimore-curfew-law-sparks-
controversy/26310430. 
371 See Gately, supra note 368.   
     Marvin “Doc” Cheatham, a longtime civil rights leader in Baltimore, recognizes 
“[m]any of our adults need training; they do[ not] know how to be parents. . . . You[ 
have] got children raising children. . . . We have a problem with parental issues and 
we need programs to better teach our parents how to be better parents.”  Id.  
Cheatham advocates for the city to expand recreation opportunities for children, 
pointing out that men in the West Baltimore community for which he serves as 
president of the community association are willing to coach sports and teach children 
to read.  Id. 
372 For additional proposals, see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., SUPPORTING 
BALTIMORE’S YOUNG PEOPLE TO BE SAFE: AN ALTERNATE PLAN TO THE EXPANSION 
OF BALTIMORE’S YOUTH CURFEW (2014), available at http://aclu-
md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0527/baltimore_youth_alternate_plan_5_28_14.pdf. 
373 See Orly Jashinsky, Liberty for All? Juvenile Curfews: Always An 
Unconstitutional and Ineffective Solution, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 547 
n.192 (2007) (citing Boston Police Dep’t & Partners, The Boston Strategy to Prevent 
Youth Violence, Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement 12 (1997)). 
374 See Privor, supra note 347, at 476. 
375 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
376 See Privor, supra note 347, 481. 
377 See id. at 478. 
378 See id. at 477-78. 
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Boston’s approach to reducing juvenile crime and victimization has proved to 
be successful379 in a city which does not have a juvenile curfew in force.380 
     Notwithstanding the standard of scrutiny a court chooses to apply to an 
equal protection challenge to Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew, the wisdom 
behind the curfew deserves to be tested.  Better still, regardless of any 
challenge in court to the curfew, the city’s chosen method of reducing juvenile 
crime, victimization, and delinquency, and encouraging parents to take a more 
proactive role in raising their children, must be challenged. 
 
CONCLUSION 
     The Baltimore City Council enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance, the 
language of which stated that its restrictions on a minor’s presence in public 
during certain hours will reduce juvenile crime, victimization, and 
delinquency.  The curfew’s language did not state that it will incentivize 
parents to become more active in, and take more responsibility for, raising 
their children.  Nevertheless, the City Council’s interest in parents doing just 
that is no less than its interests in seeing a drop in the juvenile crime, 
victimization, and delinquency rates.  That the City Council took pains to 
explicate its interests underlying the curfew, but did not explicate all of its 
interests, is worthy of concern. 
    The curfew’s enforcement patterns result in racially disproportionate effects 
which disadvantage minorities, particularly African-Americans.  More 
evidence is necessary to demonstrate that the curfew’s two age-based 
classifications were intended to target minority children in their parents. 
     Moreover, such evidence is necessary, yet inexplicably unavailable, to 
prove the curfew’s age-based classifications unduly burden minorities.  The 
curfew will, therefore, survive an equal protection attack on grounds of age 
discrimination, even under a rational basis review “with teeth” standard.  Still, 
the curfew is vulnerable to an equal protection attack on grounds of race 
discrimination. 
     Mounting a successful equal protection attack to the curfew’s racially 
disproportionate effects hinges on triggering strict scrutiny.  Because the 
curfew does not facially draw race-based distinctions, strict scrutiny will apply 
only upon proof of the curfew’s racially discriminatory purpose and effects.  
The daytime and nighttime curfews can survive strict scrutiny only if they are 
necessary to reduce the juvenile crime, victimization, and delinquency rates, 
and to provide children with needed parental support. 
     However, what data and other objective evidence that are available does 
nothing to demonstrate that Baltimore City’s juvenile crime, victimization, 
and delinquency rates have dropped, or that the curfew’s restrictions have 
caused them to drop.  Further still, the alternative means proposed in Part III, 
                                                                                                                               
379 See id. 475 (providing statistical data indicating a dramatic drop in juvenile 
victimization). 
380 See id. at 474 (citation omitted). 
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by which the City Council can more effectively reach the goals the curfew 
seeks to advance or achieve, show the curfew’s restrictions are not necessary. 
     Thus, bringing a successful equal protection challenge to the curfew’s 
racially disproportionate effects depends only on whether objective evidence 
of such effects are sufficient to prove a racially discriminatory purpose behind 
the curfew.  Although already apparent from the curfew’s enforcement 
patterns, more objective evidence of the curfew’s racially disproportionate 
effects is needed to prove a racially discriminatory purpose.  Once the evidence 
triggers strict scrutiny, the curfew’s needlessness and ineffectiveness will keep 
it from surviving strict scrutiny. 
